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ABSTRACT 
Contrary to the widespread opinion of Europeanisation scholars that the EU transforms states, having 
transformative power, the theory of the EU’s pathological power argues that in the area of rule of law 
the EU has negatively reinforcing effects on certain rule of law dimensions which results in weak rule 
of law. The thesis will test the theory of EU’s pathological power against rule of law in Serbia, 
through a case study on judiciary reforms. The thesis aims to find out if the EU has pathological 
effects on Serbia’s rule of law after Serbia became a candidate country in 2012 as well as to contribute 
to the development of the theory of the EU’s pathological power on the case of Serbia. In order to 
trace developments of rule of law during the four-year period, the thesis will employ a qualitative 
content analysis with process tracing of new empirical material, i.e. three types of reports which 
provided information about the state of the Serbian judiciary from 2013 to 2016. If results confirm the 
theory, the theory of the EU’s pathological power will be strengthened, which is of vast importance 
not just for academia, but for society and the policy-making process on the EU level, as it will be 
showed that EU reforms do not improve but rather worsen the state of rule of law. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
With the beginning of the new century, countries of the Western Balkans commenced a long process 
of state and economy transformation and began official relations with the European Union (EU). One 
of the areas that particularly needed to be reformed and improved was the rule of law. However, 
having a satisfactory level of rule of law was a problem not just for candidate states but also for 
Member States (MSs).1 Bulgaria and Romania have continued to face problems with rule of law even 
after they joined the Union in 2007, because of which judiciary reforms, through which the rule of law 
is promoted, became a priority for the European Union (EU) in relation to future enlargement.2  
Nevertheless, despite the importance of the issue, there is little research on Europeanisation of the 
judiciary in candidate states.3 When analysing how Europeanisation affects countries, scholars mainly 
argue that the EU has transformative powers, which entails that it transforms the state and the 
economy.4 To the contrary, the theory of the EU’s pathological powers argues that the EU has 
negatively reinforcing, i.e. pathological effects on certain rule-of-law dimensions in countries with 
unfavourable domestic conditions, which results in countries having weak rule of law after EU 
reforms were conducted. With this in mind, this thesis intends to investigate the effects of EU reforms 
on rule of law in Serbia. Serbia is chosen to be examined, as Serbia is among “the most reluctant 
Europenizers…persistently understudied and undertheorized in the Europeanisation literature.”5 
Previous research in relation to Serbian rule-of-law reforms until 2012 has showed that EU reforms 
did not improve certain dimensions of the rule of law, which was particularly the case with judicial 
independence, while Mendelski who examined Serbia through his comparative case study of the South 
Eastern European countries (SEE) argues that the EU’s power had pathological effects. Being a 
Serbian lawyer since five years back, I witnessed changes in relation to the state of the judiciary 
through my work. I noticed progress in some of the areas but I also saw that there was greater legal 
uncertainty as laws and regulations were often amended. However, Serbia has gained candidate status 
in 2012 which implies that it progressed in its road towards the EU. As membership is now closer, it 
can be assumed that Serbia also made progress in relation to the rule of law. This thesis will analyse 
the state of rule of law in Serbia after it became a candidate country by testing and developing the 
theory of the EU’s pathological powers against the case of Serbia.  
Aside from my personal interest in such an analysis the choice of writing this master is made as the 
issue of rule of law in EU terms is highly relevant socially, culturally, politically and economically. As 
Serbia is in the process of becoming an EU MS, at the same time as the EU is facing an existential 
crisis following the UK’s exit, the effects of the process of Europeanisation is heavily debated in 
political and academic discourse, particularly with respect to the rule of law, which is a key in the 
context of European integration as a politically driven process. Namely, rule of law affects every 
                                                     
1 Kmezić, Marko (2017) EU Rule of Law Promotion: Judiciary reforms in the Western Balkans, p.5. 
2 Dallara, Cristina. (2014), Democracy and judicial reforms in South-East Europe. Between the eu and the 
legacies of the past, XIX; Kmezić, M. (2017), p.5, 52. 
3 Kmezić, Marko (2014) Europeanisation by Rule of Law Implementation in the Western Balkans, p.61. 
4 Vachudova, M. A. (2005), Chapter 7, p.3. 
5 Subotić, J. (2010), Explaining Difficult States The Problems of Europeanisation in Serbia, East European 
Politics and Societies, SAGE publications. 
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aspect of citizens’ lives, and without satisfactory rule of law it is not possible to have a fully 
democratic state which ensures citizens’ rights and liberties. 
This study is relevant for research in European studies, as it contributes to the study on how the rule of 
law develops during the process of Europeanisation. It is also relevant for legal research as it examines 
how rule of law is exercised in practice. Finally, the study is important in relation to the EU policy-
making process, since the findings can show how successful the reform approach that the EU pursues 
is and therefore perhaps provide guidelines for a change in EU policy making. 
The thesis aim is therefore to test the theory of the EU’s pathological powers against case of Serbia as 
well as to contribute to further development of the theory, in order to assess whether rule of law in 
Serbia improved after Serbia became a candidate country. The thesis will be a qualitative deductive 
case study that will test new empirical data against the mentioned theory by doing a content analysis 
and process tracing of three types of reports about the state of rule of law from 2013 to 2016. 
1.1. Outline 
This thesis will first discuss the notion of rule of law, after which the theoretical part which relates to 
the concept of Europeanisation will be presented. Aside from other sections, the theoretical part will 
introduce the theory of the EU’s pathological powers against which Serbian rule of law will be tested. 
Following this, the thesis will continue by providing previous research about judiciary reforms in 
Serbia from the beginning of the Europeanisation process. This part will conclude with a section that 
presents the aim of the thesis, research problem, research question and hypothesis. Following this, the 
method and design of the study will be introduced and the thesis will continue with an analysis of 
three types of reports that will be presented chronologically. Finally, the findings of the study will be 
presented in the conclusion.   
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2. EUROPEANISATION: GENERAL TERMS 
2.1 Rule of Law in the EU Context 
In EU documents, the principle of rule of law is often presented together with notions such as 
democracy, fundamental rights and liberty.6 It is listed as one of the values on which the Union is 
founded and which, according to Article 2 of the EU Treaty, must to be respected.7 It presents one of 
the Copenhagen political criteria that a country needs to fulfil before it becomes a member state. 
European Commission Progress Reports measure rule-of-law criteria through benchmarks of judicial 
independence, judicial capacity, right to a fair trial and efficiency of the court system. Reforms of the 
judicial system thus became the main pillar for assessment of rule-of-law criteria, which were included 
in Progress reports under political criteria and the specific section of the “Judicial System” since 
1998.8 After the 2007 enlargement the EU took a stand that judiciary reforms particularly need to be 
taken into account when negotiating with future MSs, since Bulgaria and Romania continued to have 
problems with the rule of law even as MSs. Serbia and Montenegro thus became the first candidate 
countries after Croatia for which the EU applied a new approach placing at the centre of negotiations  
Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights)  and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security), in which the 
rule of law is discussed.9   
2.2. The Notion of Europeanisation 
The study on the effects of EU reforms on Serbia’s rule of law is inseparable from the concept of 
Europeanisation. This part of the thesis will therefore present how Europeanisation is defined and 
what its effects are.  
According to the most commonly adopted meaning, Europeanisation is the process of adaptation of 
national governance to the European system of rules and governance. This does not relate solely to the 
changes in policy and structure, but also to changes in domestic identities and discourses which 
happen with the acceptance of European values.10 Ladrech (1994) was among the first to provide a 
definition explaining Europeanisation as an “incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape 
of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational 
logic of national politics and policy-making”.11 Nevertheless, scholars explain that the European 
integration process is a complex process influenced also by domestic actors, from bottom-up, although 
majority of definitions presented Europeanisation as a top-down process.12 This, because in the 
                                                     
6 Kmezić, M. (2017), p.13. 
7 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 2012/C 326/01, Article 2; Article 2, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, European Commission (2007/C 306/01), Lisbon 2007. 
8 Dallara, C. (2014), XIX. 
9 Kmezić, M. (2017), p. 5 & p. 52. 
10 OLSEN, JOHAN P. (2002), THE MANY FACES OF EUROPEANIZATION, P. 924, P. 932 & P. 935. 
11 Ladrech, R. (1994) Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France, p. 69. 
12 Vink, Maarten (2003), What is Europeanization? and other questions on a new research agenda, p.66; 
Graziano Paolo, Vink Maarten P. (2013) Europeanization: Concept Theory and Methods, p.38 
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Europeanisation process states were not just “downloading” EU rules and policies but were also 
“uploading” their “preferences“ knowing it would be easier to adapt to these EU policies and rules if 
they are similar to their preferences.13 
The concept of Europeanisation refers to MSs, candidate states, states that have a membership 
perspective, quasi members (members of EEA but not of the EU) but it goes also beyond Europe, to 
the states that are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).14 When it comes to candidate 
states, it is argued that the Europeanisation of candidate countries is a distinctive area of research, a 
sub-field of general Europeanisation literature especially when taking into account Europeanisation of 
CEE countries.15 This is because the EU mainly exercised a conditionality mechanism when it was 
transferring rules to future MSs, applying the “top-down” approach, instead of the “two way nature of 
Europeanisation”.16 Moreover, there was great asymmetry in the power between the EU and these 
states and Europeanisation of these countries was also distinctive due to their post-communist 
characteristics.17 
2.3. Two Approaches: Logic of Consequentiality and Logic of Appropriateness 
There are two contrasting approaches that explain how countries involved in the Europeanisation 
process adopt EU rules: rationalist-institutionalism and constructivist-institutionalism.18 They have 
roots in March & Olsen’s distinction between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of 
consequentiality.19 
According to the rationalist-institutionalists’ approach, which employs the logic of consequentiality, a 
country acts strategically in order to maximize its utility and it chooses to abide to EU conditions on 
the basis of its cost-benefit calculations.20 Advocates of this approach argue that “the cost-benefit 
calculations of the candidate country can be successfully manipulated by the EU through external 
incentives (sanctions and rewards).”21 Namely, the EU provides a reward to a state if the country 
fulfils the conditions that the EU sets, while it withholds the reward if a state fails to fulfil the 
requirements. Within this model, the EU uses a conditionality mechanism as a strategy to incentivize 
the candidate state to comply with EU rules.22 Arguably, the mechanism of EU conditionality is more 
probable to be successful if the accession state is conditioned by greater rewards (of which the greatest 
is the membership perspective) and if rewards are credible—if the target country is assured that it will 
                                                     
13 Bache, Ian (2008) Europeanization and multilevel governance: cohesion policy in the European Union and 
Britain, p.10. 
14 Schimmelfennig, Frank (2012) Europeanization beyond Europe, p.5. 
15 Sedelmeier U. (2011), Europeanisation in new member and candidate states, p. 29. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18  Vink, M. (2003), What is Europeanization? and other questions on a new research agenda, p. 67-68; See 
March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P. (2004) Logic of appropriateness, Arena Working paper 04/09, Centre for European 
Studies University of Oslo. 
19 See March & Olsen, Logic of appropriateness, Arena Working paper 04/09, Centre for European Studies 
University of Oslo.  
20 Schimmelfennig, F. (2012), p. 6-7. 
21 Kmezić, M. (2017), p. 22- 23. 
22Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (2004) “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, p .663; Sedelmeier Ulrich (2011), Europeanisation in new member 
and candidate states, p. 29; Schimmelfennig Frank (2012) Europeanization beyond Europe, p. 7. 
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receive the promised reward. Further factors that increase the probability of success are that 
requirements are clear (so that the target state knows precisely what conditions it must fulfil) and that 
the domestic costs are not excessive to the point where the power base of incumbent governments is 
threatened.23   
On the other hand, according to the constructivist-institutionalists’ approach, the target country 
adheres to EU norms and rules, as these are perceived as appropriate and legitimate, and is therefore 
driven by the logic of appropriateness and not by external incentives.24 The argument goes that “rules 
are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate.”25 Namely, the EU 
educates domestic societies (e.g. civil societies, parties, NGO’s, companies), about EU policies and 
norms by a social-learning model which uses mechanisms of socialization and persuasion that in the 
end stimulate domestic societies to adopt EU rules.26 Or in the so-called lesson-drawing model, states 
adopt EU norms as they themselves are unsatisfied with the current conditions in their country and 
find EU norms appropriate to solve their domestic problems.27  
 
                                                     
23 Schimmelfennig F. (2012), p. 8; Sedelmeier, U. (2011), p .29. 
24 Kmezić, M. (2017), p. 23. 
25 See March James G. & Olsen Johan P. (2004), ABSTRACT. 
26 Schimmelfennig, F. (2012), p. 8-9; Kmezić, M. (2017), p. 23. 
27 Schimmelfennig, F. (2012), p.7, 9. 
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3. EFFECTS OF EUROPEANISATION 
Hix and Goetz stated that it is not important by whom European integration is driven, “whether 
delegation is determined by domestic government preferences, driven by transnational economic 
actors, or 'cultivated' by supranational agents”, but how it affects the domestic arena.28 
This section will present theoretical standpoints of scholars in relation to the effects of 
Europeanisation, of which one relates to the theory against which the case of Serbian rule of law will 
be tested. 
3.1. Transformative effects 
Scholars of Europeanisation mainly argue that Europeanisation has a transformative effect, especially 
when taking into account CEE countries that joined the Union in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).29 They argue that eight East Central 
European post-communist states profited from the EU prospects of membership, from their 
institutional and knowledge transfers and in general from relations with the EU.30 Ekiert, Kubik and 
Vachudova (2007) find that “the European Union may be presiding over the most successful 
democracy promotion program ever implemented by an international actor…every democratizing state 
that has become a credible future member of the European Union (except perhaps Serbia) has made 
steady progress toward liberal democracy”.31 They claim that without EU enlargement, the political 
and economic paths of EU neighbours “would have visible costs”.32 
According to Vachudova, the EU possesses so-called passive and active leverage by which it 
influences future MSs. Passive leverage is reflected in the economic and political benefits that EU 
membership entails and which in fact attract other countries to join the Union. On the other hand, 
active leverage is explained as “deliberate conditionality exercised in the EU's pre accession 
process”.33 It refers to three groups of criteria—the Copenhagen political criteria, the Copenhagen 
economic criteria and the acquis communautaire or EU legislation—that a candidate country has to 
fulfil in order to gain EU membership.34  
Vachudova clarifies that there are three mechanisms that “translate the EU's active leverage into 
reforms of the state and the economy”—EU conditionality, credible commitment and empowering of 
certain groups of society.35 The EU conditionality mechanism affects countries to adopt reforms due to 
(1) the existence of asymmetrical interdependence on the side of the Union, (2) the duty of a candidate 
country to enforce the EU requirements before accession, and (3) the reward which a candidate 
                                                     
28 Hix, Simon and Goetz, Klaus H. (2000) Introduction: European integration and national political systems, 
p.3-4. 
29 See Vachudova M. A (2005); See Grabbe, H. 2006. The Eu’s transformative power. Europeanization through 
conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. 
30 Ekiert, G., Kubik, J. and Vachudová, M. A. (2007), “Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An Unending 
Quest?”, p. 12. 
31 Ekiert, G., Kubik, J. and Vachudová, M. A. (2007), p. 22. 
32 Id, p. 24. 
33 Vachudova M. A. (2005), Chapter 3, p. 2 & p. 5. 
34 Id, Chapter 5, p. 22. 
35 Id, Chapter 7, p. 3. 
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country gets when it fulfils the requirement (meritocracy).36 As regards to credible commitment, she 
argues that by adopting reforms the candidate state shows to domestic and international actors that the 
country is committed to reforms, thus presenting a promising signal for a stable economic 
environment because of which future governments also continue with reforms. On the other hand the 
EU empowers different groups of society that will benefit from EU membership, which causes these 
civic groups to call for reform of the state.37 These three mechanisms thereby induce reforms in 
candidate countries through “transformative” conditionality—a long-lasting process through which the 
state, the society, and the economy are transformed.38 
3.2. Limited Transformative Effect 
Some scholars argue that Europeanisation has limited transformative effects. Jonasson (2013) 
examined EU democracy promotion within the ENP framework in neighbouring Mediterranean 
countries, Jordan and Turkey, and concluded that EU conditionality was limited as EU policy has 
yielded little results in relation to democracy in both countries.39 According to Jonasson EU 
conditionality alone is not a sufficient mechanism for successful democracy promotion if there is no 
orientation of the candidate state towards European norms, local ownership of the project, and 
dialogue between the candidate country and the Union. These are not the only necessary conditions for 
the existence of democracy but they increase the chance for the success of democracy promotion.40   
Börzel and Pamuk (2012) argue that Europeanisation has very limited transformative effects beyond 
its borders. Their research on neighbouring countries of the Southern Caucasus region (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia) which face great problems with corruption showed that EU reforms in fact 
strengthened the corrupt governments. Governments instrumentalised reforms for the fight against 
corruption and used them to decrease the power of their political opponents, and Europeanisation did 
not manage to remove patronage and clientelistic networks.41 Börzel and Pamuk named these opposite 
negative effects of the EU reforms “pathologies of Europeanisation”, arguing that they in fact reveal 
the “dark side of Europeanisation”. They stated that “Europeanisation can have unintended and 
negative effects on the domestic structures of states. EU policies and institutions…can also bolster the 
power of incumbent authoritarian and corrupt elites.”42  
3.3. Reinforcing Effects 
Mendelski (2014) claims that the EU’s judicial reforms, i.e. EU conditionality in rule-of-law, does not 
have transformative but reinforcing effects, which could be either healthy (positive) or pathological 
(negative), depending on existing country conditions.43 In countries with solid rule of law that conduct 
                                                     
36 Id, Chapter 5, p. 6. 
37 Vachudova, M. A. (2005), Chapter 7, p. 7, p. 11, p. 14 & p. 16. 
38 Id, Chapter 7, p. 3. 
39 Jonasson, Ann-Kristin (2013), The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbours, 
Orientation, ownership and dialogue in Jordan and Turkey, p. 3 & p. 240. 
40 Jonasson, Ann-Kristin (2013), p. 34. 
41 Börzel, T. A. and Pamuk, Y. (2012), “Pathologies of Europeanisation: fighting corruption in the Southern 
Caucasus”, p. 1-2, p. 5-6 & p. 11. 
42 Börzel, T. A. and Pamuk, Y. (2012), p. 1-2. 
43 Mendelski, Martin (2014), Dissertation: The Limits of the European Union’s Transformative Power: 
Pathologies of Europeanization and Rule of Law Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Abstract and p.8. 
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reforms in a healthy (e.g. non-politicised) way, EU conditionality reinforces healthy reform pathways. 
On the other hand, in countries where rule of law is weak, where domestic reforms are conducted in a 
deficient way, EU conditionality reinforces negative trends or pathologies which is why the EU has 
pathological power.44 The latter contributes to the dark side of Europeanisation that was mentioned 
above under 4.2.45 This difference in the two reform pathways exists because weak rule of law 
countries, contrary to strong rule of law countries, lack domestic independent horizontal-
accountability institutions (e.g. Ombudsman, Judicial Council etc.) which would constrain both the EU 
and domestic reformers to instrumentalise and misuse rule-of-law reforms.46 Therefore, according to 
Mendelski, the effects of the reforms depend on the interplay between domestic conditions and the EU 
reform approach.  
This part of the thesis will present the theory against which Serbian rule of law will be tested. The 
thesis is however delimitated to including only those of Mendelski’s studies that are made in relation 
to SEE countries, including Serbia. 
3.3.1. Multi-dimensional Concept of Rule of Law 
Mendelski analysed the effects of EU reforms on the rule of law by examining de jure rule of law and 
de facto rule of law, as two components of the multi-dimensional concept of rule of law of which each 
one contains two more elements. 
De jure rule of law refers to the quality of laws and it contains formal legality and substantive legality. 
Formal legality implies that laws are clear, non-contradictory, and coherent (easy to follow and to 
apply) as well as that they are stable and non-changing in the long term (which provide predictability 
in the decision-making process).47 Substantive legality implies that laws ensure certain rights and 
principles that are internationally accepted (e.g. by the United Nations), while aligning a state’s 
legislation with these principles and rights (e.g. by accepting EU standards), is called “legal 
approximation”.48  
On the other hand, de facto rule of law refers to the quality of the judicial system and it includes 
judicial capacity and judicial impartiality. Judicial capacity relates to human, technical and financial 
resources which are necessary for the judiciary to function efficiently, timely and effectively.49 
Judicial impartiality implies that verdicts are made by an independent and accountable judge who 
exercised rule of law without biases and was not bribed. Judicial impartiality contains six principles: 
independent judiciary, principle of separation of powers, judicial accountability, non-corrupted 
judiciary, law accountability in a broader sense (both horizontal and vertical) and “citizens’ trust in 
justice” which indicates the extent of the judiciary’s independence and fairness.50 However, 
Mendelski, stressed that higher judicial capacity does not necessarily mean that there exists rule of 
                                                     
44 Mendelski, M. (2014), Abstract and p.8; Mendelski, M. (2015), “The EU’s pathological power: The failure of 
external rule of law promotion in South Eastern Europe”, p. 320. 
45 See Börzel, T. A. and Pamuk, Y. 2012. “Pathologies of Europeanisation: fighting corruption in the Southern 
Caucasus”. 
46Mendelski, M. (2016), Europeanization and the Rule of Law: Towards a Pathological Turn, p.348-349; 
Mendelski, M. (2014), p. 13. 
47 Mendelski, M. (2015), p. 321. 
48 Id, p. 322. 
49 Id, p. 321-322. 
50 Id, p. 322-323. 
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law, since resources can be misused for the purpose of someone’s particular interests. Thus, judicial 
impartiality presents the crucial component of de facto rule of law.51 
Mendelski argues that reformers should pay attention to improve all four dimensions respectively as 
enhancing of one dimension does not lead to the improvement of rule of law.52 Namely, he argues that 
“aligning domestic legislation with international standards will not establish the rule of law if the new 
laws and regulations become unstable, incoherent or are not enforced. Similarly, creating capable but 
not sufficiently impartial judiciaries (and vice versa) will not necessarily improve the rule of law.”53  
3.4. The EU’s Pathological Power 
Mendelski claims that the EU has pathological powers, i.e. negatively reinforcing effects on the rule of 
law in countries where domestic conditions are unfavourable. He explains that EU reforms in 
combination with domestic reforms that are pathological reinforce negative trends, i.e. pathologies 
which undermine two crucial rule-of-law dimensions of judicial impartiality (de facto rule of law) and 
formal legality (de jure rule of law). Although it does not have negative effects on all four rule-of-law 
dimensions, the negative effect is predominant as it undermines two crucial dimensions and thereby 
the power is pathological.  The EU and domestic reformers thus weaken the rule of law instead of 
improving it.54 Mendelski clarified that “the EU’s pathological power, though, is an indirect effect, as 
its outcome depends on a country’s domestic conditions, and in particular on the already existing level 
of its rule of law and the way in which reforms are conducted.”55 
Mendelski found that reforms in weak rule of law countries were conducted in a vicious “pathological 
reform cycle”, which he explained by using Myrdal’s logic of circular cumulative causation, i.e. 
reinforcement of dynamics that are negative.56 Namely, he stated that negative trends or pathologies 
were created or reinforced in countries with unfavourable domestic conditions where domestic 
authorities have used a pathological reform approach (by instrumentalising and politicising reforms) 
and where the EU with its pathological power applied a reform approach that was inconsistent and 
partisan. Negative trends or pathologies deteriorated judicial impartiality and formal legality, i.e. two 
out of four rule-of-law dimensions, resulting in a weakening of absolute rule of law.57  
Mendelski explained that unfavourable domestic conditions were the initial negative dynamic that 
was probably a consequence of communist legacies and transition processes. In such domestic 
conditions, the second negative dynamic occurred, i.e. “the domestic reform approach became 
pathological”.58 Namely, domestic authorities were instrumentalising reforms by conducting them 
according to their personal interest, in order to secure their positions or to fight their political 
opponents.  They did this through the misuse of adoption of laws under urgent procedures and they 
politicised both new and old bodies and institutions, as was the case with the Judicial Council, which 
                                                     
51 Id, p. 322. 
52 Mendelski M. (2016) The EU’s rule of law promotion in Central and Eastern Europe:  Where and why does it 
fail and what can be done about it?’, p. 5. 
53 Mendelski M.(2016), p. 5. 
54 Mendelski, M. (2015), p. 319; Mendelski, M. (2014), p. 9. 
55 Id, p. 319. 
56 Id, p. 334. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Id, p. 335. 
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“opened up a different channel of political influence“, in many countries.59 The EU’s pathological 
power further reinforced this pathological domestic reform approach thereby being the third negative 
dynamic of the pathological reform cycle. The EU used a partisan and inconsistent method when 
conducting reforms, as it was biased in relation to veto players and domestic change agents, as well as 
in the evaluation of progress reports.60 According to Mendelski “the EU tended to support reformist 
change agents, no matter how pathologically they conducted reforms or how undemocratically they 
behaved...the EU supported or cooperated with clientelistic and corrupt elites or even with members of 
governments that collaborated or were part of organized crime”.61 Moreover, the EU evaluated and 
monitored reforms, with progress reports that relied on information from pro-Western NGO’s and 
experts that were not objective while negative information from other (e.g. Council of Europe’s) 
reports were left out in order to show domestic change agents more positively.62 The pathological 
reform approach further reinforced or created the so-called systemic pathologies, i.e “pathologies of 
Europeanisation”, which was the fourth negative dynamic that happened.63 Pathologies on the other 
hand negatively affected and decreased judicial impartiality and formal legality thereby undermining 
the rule of law which was the fifth negative dynamic. The latter resulted in the overall low level of 
the rule of law, which was the final negative dynamic of the pathological reform cycle.64 
According to Mendelski, there are three Europeanisation problems that undermine rule of law and 
cause pathologies. The first one is that the EU reform approach is based on a quantitative “the more 
the better” concept (e.g. number of laws introduced, number of verdicts) and not on the quality of the 
reforms.65 The second one is that the EU reforms cause partisan empowerment of change agents, i.e. 
the Union supported domestic reformers who were pro-European, regardless if they were controversial 
politicians that behaved undemocratically.66 The third Europeanisation problem is that the EU 
evaluates reforms of rule of law in a biased way. Namely, the EU was more positive in the evaluation 
of rule of law of pro-European governments than of anti EU, illiberal countries’ governments, 
although both groups of countries similarly behaved and did not respect the rule of law.67 
3.4.1. Pathologies of Europeanisation 
The pathological reform approach of the EU and domestic reformers created or reinforced negative 
trends—pathologies of legal instability, legal incoherence, politicization of judicial structures, lack of 
enforcement of law and lack of generality of law. 
Mendelski explains that the pathology of legal instability implies an increase of legal instability, 
which happened as laws were rapidly changed and adopted by domestic parliaments under fast 
legislating procedures. Domestic reformers misused urgent adoption of laws for their personal interest, 
while the EU pressured for approximation of domestic legislation with the EU acquis and it evaluated 
country progress according to the quantity of the adopted laws.68 The pathology of legal incoherence 
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implies that laws were contradictory and incoherent which caused inconsistency in judicial decisions. 
It happened because legislation quality deteriorated due to the instrumentalised and executive-driven 
domestic reforms, as well as because various international experts and donors applied and proposed 
different methods and laws from their own countries which further worsened legal incoherence in the 
domestic judiciary.69As regards to the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures, this implies 
that the new and old judiciary bodies and institutions (e.g. anti-corruption agencies, judicial councils 
etc.) were misused, controlled and captured by change actors, since change actors used these 
institutions in non-democratic and non-transparent ways for advancing their political agenda.70 When 
it comes to the pathology of lack of enforcement of laws, this implies that laws were formally 
adopted but not implemented in practice, due to high domestic costs and veto players who were 
against these reforms.71 Lastly, the pathology of lack of generality of law, implies that laws were not 
neutral, because new laws were introduced and amended with the aim “to fulfil particular interest of 
influential captors” who wanted to fight their competitors.72 
Mendelski concludes that the abovementioned pathologies are systemic, with long-term effects which 
are constantly repeated when reforms are conducted, regardless if change actors or veto players are 
driving reforms. His research on SEE countries showed that EU reforms in combination with the 
domestic factors improved substantive legality and judicial capacity, but did not improve judicial 
impartiality and formal legality. Since the two crucial rule-of-law dimensions were undermined, the 
pathological effect was predominant and the EU powers therefore had pathological effects.73 The 
thesis will present the findings from Mendelski’s comparative study on SEE countries in the next 
section which presents previous research in relation to the judicial system in Serbia.  
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4. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN SERBIA FROM THE 
BEGINNING OF EUROPEANISATION  
4.1. Previous research 
Serbia started official relations with the EU after the “October revolution” in 2000 when president 
Milošević’s regime ended. It became involved in the EU Stabilisation and Association process (SAP) 
and in 2012, Serbia became a candidate country.74 
This section will present what has previously been written in relation judiciary reforms in Serbia after 
it was involved in the process of Europeanisation in 2000. As a notice, it should be mentioned that 
there is much more literature in regard to CEE countries than in regard to the SEE countries. 
According to Kmezić (2014) “research on Europeanization of the judiciary in candidate countries 
remains rare”.75 As regards rule-of-law reforms, Serbia was mainly examined in comparative studies 
of SEE countries and seldom alone.  
This section includes only previous research in relation to the EU judiciary reforms in Serbia, although 
at some points it briefly mentions some results in relation to other SEE countries that were examined 
together with Serbia. It does not, however, include literature that discusses Serbia’s EU integration 
process in general.  
Dallara had studied four South East European countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Serbia) from 
2000 to 2012 and her results showed that the EU judicial reforms in each country were influenced by 
domestic factors and forces. In Romania and Serbia “domestic actors challenged judicial reforms and 
hampered the influence played by the EU strongly opposing the empowerment of judicial institutions 
and actors.”76 In some periods, EU conditionality was effective, while in other it was not, as a 
consequence of post-communist legacies, credibility of membership perspective and EU rewards and 
sanctions in different pre-accession phases.77 Dallara explained that Serbia was euphoric as it engaged 
in reforms after the start of its official relations with the Union, which is why the period between 
2000-2003 is called the “honeymoon” era.78 However, she clarified that adopted laws often lacked 
practical implementation and enforcement. Serbian domestic actors were influenced by legacies of the 
previous regime of president Milošević and the judiciary was “a potential political weapon” for 
political actors who wanted to retain control over the judicial system.79 She claims that “a truly free 
judiciary was almost impossible because its genuine independence would have profoundly 
undermined the basis of elite power”.80  
In line with Dallara, Hiber and Begović who examined the Serbian judiciary up until 2006 argue that it 
was in the personal interest of both judges and some of the politicians from Serbia not to pursue 
reforms. According to them “one of the puzzling alliances is the one between judges feared to be 
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removed from the office, seeking no change and political parties/executive government, incumbent of 
the future one, seeking no change for preserving effective control over judicial system”.81 Hiber and 
Begović clarified that political actors and powerful elites wanted to keep their influence. This was 
evident especially in the case of the High Council of Judiciary, a special body created according to EU 
reforms in 2001. The High Council of Judiciary was introduced as the only body with the authority to 
propose judicial officials that should be appointed to a function. This however led to conflicts of 
interest between three branches of power and resulted with the High Council being deprived of its 
power to propose presidents of the courts. As Hiber and Begović stated “one may easily conclude that 
there was a power struggle with regard to influence over the procedure for the appointment of 
judiciary officials, and this implies that the most important criteria were not those of professional 
quality...those who decide on appointment, or promotion, have leverage over appointees or candidates 
for appointment.”82 They argue that the judiciary after the “October revolution” in 2000 did not change 
significantly as domestic change actors, in contrast to domestic veto players, were not strong and the 
external EU impact was rather limited.83 
Kmezić & Kmezić (2014) on the other hand stated that the EU does not have some benchmarks 
according to which it assesses the rule of law in candidate countries. They argue that the term rule of 
law is unclear but “to the advantage of the EU” which could be misused by the Union.84 However, 
they studied judicial reforms in Serbia by examining judicial independence, efficiency, professional 
competence and accountability, as four benchmarks that are important for the existence of rule of 
law,85 while later Kmezić (2017) examined judicial reforms of five Western Balkan countries 
(including Serbia), during a 15-year period starting from 2000.86 Their results showed that despite an 
“impressive legislative framework” of Serbia which guarantees judges de jure independence, judges 
were in practice very much influenced and dependent. The efficiency of the judiciary was still 
unsatisfied although EU reforms were conducted.87 Kmezić claims that the proverb used in Serbia 
“Pravda je spora ali dostižna”—“Justice is slow but attainable”—was untrue, that “rather, justice 
delayed became justice denied.”88 On the other hand, professional competence which entails that 
judges are competent and skilled to exercise judicial functions, was according to Kmezić undermined 
in whole Western Balkan judiciary and even judicial decisions were questioned for their quality.89 In 
relation to accountability, which is tightly connected to judiciary independence which includes that 
judges are evaluated for their work in terms of “quantity, quality and commitment to judicial work,” 
Kmezić explained that many NGOs or the so-called watchdogs evaluate judges in their work.90 The 
overall conclusion of their analysis showed that the judiciary reform process had been “slow, 
inconsistent and dependent on the change of the ruling elites.”91 They claim that the EU approach was 
mainly based on Europeanisation conditionality mechanism as judicial reforms were one of the 
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conditions that Serbia had to fulfil in order to be closer to membership status.92 However, they argue 
that clarity of requirements and credibility criteria, which according to many scholars increase the 
effectiveness of rationalist-institutionalist strategy of conditionality in relation to the transfer of norms, 
were partly satisfied in Serbia and thus the transfer of EU norms was hindered. They pointed out that 
the EU should use both top-down (conditionality) and bottom-up mechanisms (socialisation) in order 
for the EU rule of law reforms to have successful transfer in countries in the accession process.93  
Namely, the EU should also employ soft EU mechanisms of constructivist-institutionalist, i.e. 
socialization and persuasion when transferring its norms in order to convince the “wider community” 
about the legitimacy and appropriateness of the EU reforms.94 
Dallara also found that EU conditionality did not have a strong effect in relation to the rule of law 
reforms in Serbia. She clarifies that judicial reforms were obstructed by domestic actors and the EU 
contributed to it as it set “broadly-framed conditions without clear requirements, which give great 
freedom to the government to adopt and interpret them according to their interests and standards”.95 
The EU reform approach was more concentrated on enhancing the judiciary efficiency by modernising 
the judiciary, while judicial independence as the main problem of Serbia’s judiciary was neglected.96 
She argues that the Union did not provide some exact recommendations but merely broadly claimed 
that Serbia should pay attention to judicial independence, which needs to be improved. 
In addition, Mendelski also argues that there had been much more change in judicial capacity than in 
judicial impartiality according to findings from his studies. He did a case study on Serbia’s rule of law 
for the period of 2001-201297 as well as comparative study on rule-of-law reforms in SEE countries in 
which he argues that the EU had pathological effects.98 
Results from his case study showed that EU and the US donors had a mixed impact on Serbia’s rule of 
law as they positively affected the capacity of the Serbian judiciary during one period when they 
increased judges’ salaries and provided electronic equipment which resulted in the modernisation of 
the judiciary. On the other hand, with the reform from the 2010 which restructured the court network, 
the number of judges and other court staff had been reduced by one third which caused an increase in 
backlog cases.99 As regards to judicial impartiality, there had not been any significant progress as 
reforms were conducted in a politicised and instrumentalised way and reform of judiciary 
restructuring was used to remove judges who were not willing to serve the political establishment. 
Mendelski concluded that rule-of-law reforms in Serbia failed.100 On the other hand, his mix-method 
study on the SEE rule of law showed that EU reforms in combination with domestic factors improved 
substantive legality and judicial capacity, but undermined judicial impartiality and formal legality.101 
In relation to de jure rule of law, there had been a positive trend in substantive legality as SEE 
countries mainly adopted and ratified international treaties after the fall of communism (1991-1995) 
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and in the pre-accession process due to EU conditionality (2000-2004).102 Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Bosnia were frontrunners, while Albania, Macedonia and particularly Serbia were laggards.103 On 
the other hand, the dimension of formal legality or stability of laws declined due to the high legislative 
growth, or fast adoption of large number of new laws in the pre-accession period. When it comes to de 
facto rule of law, the dimension of judicial capacity remarkably improved during the period between 
2002-2010 due to EU and international funding.104 Judicial impartiality on the other hand did not 
improve, except slightly for judicial independence indicator in one period. It particularly decreased in 
Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, due to politicisation of the judiciary. EU reforms 
had reinforcing effects on certain dimensions in a negative way, being pathological and not 
transformative as expected.105 
Hiber and Begović argue in a similar vein as Mendelski, in relation to judicial independence. They 
explain that although Serbia had separated the three branches of power (executive, legislative and 
judicial), executive power often interfered with judicial power when it comes to specific cases. 
Institutional corruption was present and judges were making biased decisions that suited the executive 
or legislative, in order to be promoted to higher positions or to be given some material advantages.106 
The executive branch had influenced judicial proceedings before decisions were made so that final 
decision was in accordance with its interests.107 As regards to judicial capacity Hiber & Begović 
explained that “international players are very interested in the subject of changing (reducing) the 
number of judges, hence the majority of the foreign assistance is based on the rather straightforward 
improvement of the premises and IT.”108 They clarified that EU funding increased judges’ salaries, 
which was of importance for the prevention of corruption but that donated electronic equipment was 
left unused in practice as judicial staff was not trained to use it.109 
4.2. Summary of Previous Research 
It can be concluded that studies presented in this thesis complement each other. Scholars agree that EU 
reforms had positive effects on judicial capacity in one period as the judiciary was modernised and 
salaries were increased, but that reforms in one period made the problem of backlog cases even 
worse. They agree that reforms did not improve the level of judicial independence due to the forces of 
domestic politicians who under influence of the past post-communist legacies struggled to retain 
power over the judiciary, as well as because of the EU reform approach. Kmezić and Kmezić study 
also showed that the level of professional competence in the Western Balkan judiciary was low, while 
it can be assumed that judges’ accountability was satisfied.110  Mendelski’s comparative study showed 
that reforms positively affected substantive legality, as SEE countries were adopting international 
treaties and standards, while at the same time reforms negatively affected formal legality or laws’ 
stability.111 Studies showed that the EU conditionality mechanism was limited, as EU reforms did not 
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have success in relation to certain aspects of the judicial system, while Mendelski’s comparative study 
on the SEE countries, which also included Serbia, showed that EU conditionality had pathological 
effect.   
Previous studies mainly examined rule of law in Serbia from 2000 up to the year 2012, with exception 
of Kmezić’s analysis of Western Balkan countries.112Nevertheless, although Kmezić examined a 
longer period providing a detailed normative analysis, his analysis of the effects in practice mainly 
concentrated on the period before 2012 with only few examples from 2012 and 2013. On the other 
hand, Mendelski examined SEE countries using a mixed method research design (quantitative and 
qualitative analysis), but the period that he examined is unclear. The tables from his analysis show that 
he did a quantitative analysis of formal legality dimension until 2012, substantive legality/rule 
approximation until 2013, judicial impartiality until 2012, while for judicial capacity he mentions 
earlier periods (year 2010).113 He provided results for SEE countries in general and only occasionally 
mentioned examples from concrete SEE countries.  
The thesis will therefore contribute to an empirical gap in present research, as it will examine 
specifically the period from 2013 until 2016 by testing the theory of EU’s pathological power against a 
new period, and only in relation to Serbia. As Serbia was rarely thoroughly examined in case studies, 
this study will thereby contribute to the literature on Europeanisation in SEE countries, 
Europeanisation of candidate countries, which is according to some a sub-field of the Europeanisation 
literature,114 to the literature on Europeanisation of the judiciary in candidate countries, which remains 
rare,115 as well as to the literature on the Dark side of Europeanisation. The study will thus in general 
contribute to the research field of European studies, but also to legal studies as it examines rule of law 
in practice. Since this will be a deductive study, if empirical findings confirm the theory of EU’S 
pathological power, there will be a generalisation of the theory as the study will contribute to the 
existing theoretical understanding of Mendelski. The study is thereby important for EU policy makers 
since findings of the study can result in some possible changes in the EU reform approach, having in 
mind that Mendelski’s theory argues that EU reforms negatively affect the overall rule of law. 
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5. PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM, 
AIM, RESEARCH QUESTION, AND HYPOTHESIS 
Having in mind findings from the previous research as well as that Serbia gained candidate status, the 
thesis will examine whether the EU has negatively reinforcing effects on Serbian rule of law after its 
membership perspective became more credible. This is because, as already mentioned in the beginning 
of the thesis, according to Europeanisation scholars the conditionality mechanism, as the most 
effective strategy for transfer of EU norms, works particularly when membership perspective is more 
credible.116 With the latter in mind, it can be assumed that Serbian rule of law improved after 2012. 
The thesis will examine the period from 2013 until 2016, as Serbia became a candidate country in 
2012 while in July 2016 it opened Chapter 23 which discusses the rule of law and judiciary reforms. 
It will test the theory of EU’s pathological power against Serbian rule of law by using a different 
method than Mendelski, which implies that the theory of EU’s pathological power will first be 
adapted, i.e. developed analytically and then developed empirically, in relation to the findings of the 
study. The thesis’ general aim is to obtain knowledge about how successful Europeanisation is in 
transferring its norms and values, and particularly in the promotion of rule of law in one Western 
Balkan candidate country. More concretely, the thesis aim is to use Mendelski’s theory in order to find 
out whether the EU has a pathological effect on Serbian rule of law after Serbia gained its candidacy 
as well as to develop Mendelski’s theory both analytically and empirically.  
Thereby, the research question of the thesis will be the following: 
 Is the Europeanisation process having a pathological effect on Serbian rule of law after Serbia 
became an EU candidate country? 
If results from the analysis show that the EU has pathological effect, the specified research question of 
the thesis will be the following: 
 To what extent and how the EU is having pathological effects? 
In order to answer the research questions, the following hypothesis that is derived from Mendelski’s 
theory of EU’s pathological power will be employed in the analysis: 
   
a) In states with initially a low level of rule of law, the EU reforms together with domestic 
actors’ reform approach reinforce pathologies which decrease judicial impartiality and 
formal legality. 
 
b) In states with initially a low level of rule of law, the EU reforms together with domestic 
actors’ reform approach improve judicial capacity and substantive legality. 
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6. DESIGN OF RESEARCH PROJECT 
6.1. Analytical Framework  
The thesis will test the previously mentioned hypothesis on new data and period by examining rule of 
law through its four dimensions that were presented with Mendelski’s theory, and which in this case 
present a variable with four sub-variables. Namely, the paper will analyse (1) substantive legality, (2) 
formal legality, (3) judicial capacity, and (4) judicial impartiality in order to verify outcomes 
specified from the hypothesis, which shows in which way the independent variable, i.e. EU reforms 
with domestic actors, affected each sub-variable of the dependent variable, i.e. rule of law. This is 
outlined below, in the Analytical Framework, in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Analytical Framework 
 Independent variables Dependent variables 
Dimensions 
Domestic trends in 
rule of law 
The EU reforms 
impact 
Effects on Rule of law, 
i.e on 4 sub-variables 
1. Substantive legality Positive Positively reinforcing Improved 
2. Formal legality Negative Negatively reinforcing Didn’t improve 
3. Judicial capacity Positive Positively reinforcing Improved 
4. Judicial impartiality Negative Negatively reinforcing Did not improve 
 
 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the thesis will adapt the testing theory to this study 
without using the same quantitative indicators that Mendelski used when measured the four rule-of-
law dimensions. Namely, the thesis will develop analytically the theory by drilling deeper into 
mechanisms of the theory of EU’s pathological power and reaching deeper in their understanding. On 
the basis of the latter it will use self-defined analytical indicators which are derived from the 
theoretical concept of rule-of-law that Mendelski used, as discussed in section “Multi-dimensional 
Concept of Rule of law” and which will serve to identify and detect the level of progress of four 
dependent sub-variables. 
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The thesis will examine the following: 
- Substantive legality, by mapping out what is stated in the reports in regard to some of the 
following indicators, namely whether Serbia aligns legislation with international rights and 
principles and/or EU standards. This is because according to the theoretical concept, 
substantive legality implies that domestic laws ensure internationally accepted principles and 
rights.117 Mendelski measured substantive legality by using an indicator of human rights treaty 
ratification. 
- Formal legality, by mapping out what is stated in the reports in regard to some of the 
following indicators, namely whether Serbian laws are coherent (non-contradictory) and 
stable (i.e. if laws frequently change), and/or clear. This is because according to the 
theoretical concept, formal legality implies an existence of non-contradictory, clear, stable 
laws which do not change in the long term.118 In this way, the thesis uses and develops 
Mendelski’s theory, since Mendelski measured formal legality by indicator of national 
legislative outputs in parliaments. 
- Judicial capacity, by mapping out what is stated in reports in regard to some of the following 
indicators, namely whether the Serbian judiciary has resources (financial, technical, 
human, spatial), and if the judiciary provides justice in efficient (e.g. by respecting right to 
a trial within reasonable time) and/or effective way (by having judicial experts i.e. level of 
professionalization). This is because according to the theoretical concept, judicial capacity 
implies the existence of enough human, technical and financial resources that create a capable 
judicial system where legislation is applied efficiently, effectively and timely.119 Mendelski 
measured judicial capacity through quantitative indicators that relate to resources, while this 
study aside from indicators of resources has chosen also indicators of judicial efficiency and 
judicial effectiveness, as inexistence of the latter would mean that the judiciary does not have 
enough capacity to provide justice in an efficient and effective way. In this way, the thesis 
uses and develops Mendelski’s theory. 
- Judicial impartiality, by mapping out what is stated in reports in regard to some of the 
following indicators, namely whether the Serbian judiciary has judicial independence 
and/or impartiality and/or judicial accountability and/or citizens’ trust and/or judicial 
corruption. This is because according to the theoretical concept, judicial impartiality 
implies that law is enforced in an unbiased way, by judges that are independent, accountable 
and non-corrupt with executive and legislative power that do not influence judicial power and 
citizens who trust their judicial system.120 
 
Furthermore, when examining the four sub-variables the thesis will look whether pathologies which 
Mendelski argues are created or reinforced, are presented in the thesis section “Pathologies of 
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Europeanisation,”121 exist in the Serbian judiciary, as well as how they affect the outcome of rule of 
law. The thesis will identify pathologies by relying on indicators in the following way: 
1. If reports show that the judiciary is faced with inconsistency in judicial decisions and case 
law, as a result of laws that are contradictory, incoherent (non-harmonised with other 
legislation), that will indicate the existence of the pathology of legal incoherence which 
undermines sub-variable formal legality. 122  
2. If reports show that laws are not stable, that they are frequently changed/amended and 
adopted under urgent procedures in order for Serbia to comply with EU legislation and/or 
for domestic actors to advance their particular interest, that will indicate the existence of the 
pathology of legal instability which undermines sub-variable formal legality 123. In this 
way the thesis uses and develops Mendelski’s theory since Mendelski discovered it through 
indicator of formal legality, i.e. through growing national legislative output in parliaments.124 
3. If reports show that adopted laws are not implemented/unevenly implemented in practice 
and/or that judicial decisions are not enforced, it will indicate the existence of the pathology 
of lack of enforcement of law.125 This pathology undermines sub-variable formal legality 
and Mendelski discovered it through interviews. 
4. If reports show that newly-adopted or amended laws are not impersonal and general, but 
provide benefits to certain groups and/or constrain specific group of people, according to 
personal interest of reformers that will indicate the existence of the pathology of lack of 
generality of law which undermines sub-variable formal legality.126 In this way the thesis 
uses and develops Mendelski’s theory, since Mendelski measured this pathology through a 
quantitative indicator of corruption in parliament/legislature.127 
5. If reports show that new and/or old judicial structures do not serve their role but lack 
independence, being used by domestic change actors in non-democratic and non-transparent 
ways for advancing their political interests, this will indicate the existence of the pathology of 
politicisation of judicial structures which undermines sub-variable judicial impartiality.128 
In this way the thesis uses and develops Mendelski’s theory, since Mendelski detected this 
pathology through a quantitative indicator of judicial independence.  
At the same time, the thesis will also examine and identify if there are some new negative trends that 
pervade the Serbian judiciary from year to year, i.e. if new pathologies are created, and in that way, 
on the basis of new data this study will try to develop Mendelski’s theory of the EU’s pathological 
power. 
The thesis will examine three types of reports that will be presented in the next section. Note, 
however, that the indicators examined by each report differ do not necessarily overlap, and if they do, 
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they don’t necessarily overlap each year. Due to this it will not be possible to state in the Analysis part 
whether each indicator progressed over time, but it will be stated whether the level of a certain 
indicator was satisfied or not. 
6.2. Methods and Data for Analysis 
Considering that the thesis examines only rule of law in Serbia, the thesis will apply the case study 
method. According to Robert Stake, in a case study the case itself is central and not the methods that 
are used.129 Since the study aims to get a deeper understanding of how EU reforms affect Serbian rule 
of law by testing the case of Serbia against the theory of the EU’s pathological power, the most 
suitable method for such an explanatory and descriptive thesis is a qualitative case study method with 
a deductive logic.130 
This study examines Serbia since Serbia is aside from being non-researched also particularly 
interesting case. Namely, Serbia was the only country in the region that had active political parties 
who were against Serbia’s EU membership.131 Thereby, it can be said that Serbia presents a unique 
case comparing to other countries from the region. However, although this will be a study or one 
country, the results can be generalized. According to Johansson “generalisation from cases are not 
statistical, they are analytical“132. In deductive case studies, when the findings from the case are tested 
against hypothesis, there will be analytical generalisation if results confirmed the theory133. Thus, if 
empirical findings show that EU reforms had pathological effects on rule-of-law reforms in Serbia, 
there will be confirmation of Mendelski’s theory of the EU’s pathological power. 
In order to find out if EU reforms have pathological effect on the rule of law in Serbia, the thesis will 
examine the Serbian judiciary by looking at different reports for the period from 2013 until 2016 using 
the method of content analysis and process tracing. The thesis has chosen to examine European 
Commission Progress Reports for Serbia, Protector of Citizens’ reports and reports of the Serbian 
Anti-Corruption Council. Progress reports are published annually by the European Commission. They 
serve to show if the country made progress during the period examined and on the basis of these 
reports, the Union decides when a candidate country will close specific chapters, finish negotiations 
and finally become a MS.134 According to Mendelski, in some cases the EU was biased when 
assessing and monitoring rule-of-law reforms, as it supported domestic pro-EU reformers even though 
they conducted reforms pathologically.135 With this in mind and in order to increase the quality and 
validity of the study and to get a broader picture of the progress in various rule-of-law dimensions, this 
study will also include Anti-Corruption Council reports and Ombudsman (Protector of citizens) 
reports, of which none has been previously examined by Mendelski. The thesis has chosen these 
reports since the Anti-Corruption Council and Ombudsman are bodies that scrutinise and detect 
irregularities in the work of Serbian public authorities and institutions, providing analysis also in 
relation to the judiciary. Namely, the Anti-Corruption Council specifically publishes reports about the 
judiciary every two years, while the Ombudsman, who is a non-party member and a protector of 
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citizens’ rights publishes reports annually and provides information about the judicial system, on the 
basis of citizens’ complaints. Previous research found that the Ombudsperson is among the actors and 
institutions that are opposing anti-reformers and whose “voice is largely marginalized and dependent 
on the willingness of government incumbents to hear it.”136 The analysis of three types of reports will 
provide the comparative picture in relation to state of rule of law from the three different sources and 
in that way it will provide a broader picture about state of rule of law dimensions in Serbian judiciary. 
The thesis expects that findings of this study will partly support the theory of the EU’s pathological 
power. Findings could possibly show that some rule of law dimensions progressed, but that despite of 
the progress, the overall rule-of-law level is still unsatisfactory. 
6.3. Limitations and Ethics 
According to some scholars the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, i.e. the use of 
contrasting methods which is called triangulation, increases the validity and credibility of the 
results.137 With this in mind, it would be better if this study aside from a qualitative analysis of reports 
also did a quantitative analysis. However, since Mendelski mainly did mix-method studies, this study 
turned towards different a method, i.e. towards a thorough analysis of the data with qualitative content 
analysis and process tracing aiming to develop his theory. In addition, time limitation was a hurdle for 
doing a quantitative analysis combined with the content analysis. Another limitation is that not all 
reports provided data in relation to certain rule of law areas for each year, because of which it was not 
possible to measure the level of progress of each indicator during the four-year period, as it is already 
stated in the Analytical Framework. Furthermore, the study has limitations in relation to the time-
frame considering that Serbia has only recently (in July 2016) opened Chapter 23 that relates to the 
rule of law. Examination of rule-of-law development a little bit further in the future would be 
particularly interesting, but this limitation however, leaves room for future studies. On the other hand, 
my profession as a lawyer could possibly be another limitation of the study, since it can be assumed 
that a researcher who does the study in relation to his workplace can be biased when doing an analysis. 
Nevertheless, I am aware of that which is why I have chosen to examine three different kinds of 
reports, as results from various sources increase the validity and credibility of the results. 
Although the study examines policy documents, there should be respect in relation to the objects that 
are examined in the study.138 Judicial independence is a sensitive issue for actors directly involved in 
the process in which sometimes the highest state functionaries are involved. Having in mind ethical 
concerns, the thesis will not include names of judges or other persons that are possibly listed in 
reports, as that could compromise these people which is not the aim of this master’s thesis.  
6.4. Content Analysis and Process Tracing 
By doing a content analysis of three types of reports, the thesis will find out what is the contextual 
meaning of the texts from the examined reports and also develop the theory on the basis of empirical 
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data.139 The thesis will do a directed content analysis, since the latter is often applied in deductive 
studies and aims “to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory”140. When 
doing a directed content analysis, the thesis will use Mendelski’s theory of the EU’s pathological 
power as a ground according to which it will set elements (indicators, sub-variables) that the thesis 
will analyse in three kinds of reports, which is already done in the section “Analytical Framework”. 
Nevertheless, directed content analysis can be biased, which presents a limitation of this approach, 
considering that it entails subjective analysis of the content where a researcher can analyse texts in 
order to find evidences that support the tested theory instead of doing the contrary.141 This study will 
however be aware of this limitation during the whole analysis, not aiming to find neither supporting 
theory evidences nor contrary, but aiming to analyze data objectively. 
The analysis will be guided by empirical indicators introduced in the section “Analytical Framework”. 
Empirical indicators will serve to identify four sub-variables in reports and to detect the level of 
progress achieved in these four sub-variables. The analysis will be done in the following way: 
I. The thesis will map out what is stated—implicitly or explicitly—in the report in relation to the 
indicators from section “Analytical Framework” for each of the four sub-variables. 
II. On the basis of what is stated about indicators, the thesis will draw conclusions about the state 
of a specific indicator. 
III. In the same way, the thesis will map out indicators of pathologies and in that way the thesis 
will find out which of the listed pathologies from section “Analytical Framework” exist in the 
Serbian judiciary.  
IV. At the same time, the thesis will map out some new negative trends, i.e. pathologies that are 
created or reinforced in the Serbian judiciary.  
V. The thesis will map out what is stated in the reports about the relation between reforms that 
were conducted and indicators of four sub-variables and pathologies. 
VI. The thesis will compare findings from the reports from the same year in order to draw 
conclusion what was the state of four sub-variables for each specific year. 
Aside from content analysis, when analysing reports the study will also apply process tracing to 
previously explained analysis steps, as the other part of the method used in this study. Since process 
tracing entails the tracing of the development of the events over time142 the thesis will look at how four 
sub-variables developed during the four-year period. This entails that results from the content analysis 
will be examined in light of reforms that were introduced in the Serbian judiciary and which are 
discussed in the reports. This will enable the thesis to find out causalities between differences in rule-
of-law progress over time and conducted reforms, i.e. to find out how rule of law was affected over 
time by conducted reforms and if these developments are in accordance with Mendelski’s theory. This 
is because the purpose of process tracing is “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence 
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selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator”.143 The 
thesis will thereby use process tracing to examine empirical results from the content analysis in order 
to detect if the results correspond to what is argued in the theory of the EU’s pathological power, i.e. if 
results match the hypothesis derived from the theory of the EU’s pathological power, as well as to 
develop the theory. The starting point for the analysis is the period after the year 2012 when Serbia 
became a candidate country. 
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7. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This part of the thesis will analyse eleven reports in total: four European Commission Progress 
Reports for Serbia (ECPR) from 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016; four Protector of Citizens’ Reports 
(PCR) from 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016; and three Anti-Corruption Council Reports (ACCR)—report 
and supplement report from 2014 and report from 2016). The analysis will be done chronologically, 
meaning that reports from the same year will be analysed one after another, since the aim is to get a 
broader picture about the state of rule of law in Serbia for each year. The analysis will be rely on 
indicators presented in the section “Analytical Framework” above and by using analysis steps 
presented in section “Content Analysis and Process Tracing” above, while the process tracing will be 
embedded throughout the text. 
7.1. The EC Progress Report 2013144 
According to the EC’s progress report 2013, which examined the period between October 2012 and 
September 2013, Serbia achieved some progress in the judiciary and fundamental rights and the 
Commission is of the opinion that “reforms are on the right track.”145  
The EC report argues that the Serbian Constitution and legislation need to be amended in relation to 
the appointment and dismissal procedure of judicial officials as they leave room for political influence 
on the judiciary. It also reports that judicial bodies of the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the State 
Prosecutorial Council (SPC) still share a court budget with the Ministry of Justice, which therefore 
indicate that the judiciary lacks independence from other branches of power both de jure and de 
facto. In relation to impartiality of judges, the EC argues that conflict of interest and random allocation 
of cases to judges have their bases in laws but that some courts either face problems with or lack a 
electronic data management system. This indicates that judges’ impartiality is not satisfied in 
practice as random allocation of cases to judges is not always applied due to lack of technical 
resources. However, it is clear that judicial impartiality is perceived much narrowly in EU report than 
in Mendelski’s theory, where judicial impartiality presents the most important rule-of-law 
dimension.146  
As regards to judicial accountability, the EC explains that one judge was sanctioned disciplinarily and 
one deputy of the public prosecutor was dismissed in 2013 although allegations in relation to 
judiciary corruption still persist. The EU therefore indirectly stated that accountability—which 
entails that laws are note enforced—is not ensured in practice and indicates the pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law. The EC particularly stressed that the judiciary faces problems with backlog 
cases, imbalances between the workload of judges, and problems with proceedings’ length, which 
indicate that the judiciary lacks efficiency. It also mentions that there is a need for training of 
administrative judges in specific areas, which indicates that the judiciary lack the capacity to be 
effective in some areas. 
On the other hand, the EC stated that all of the main international human rights instruments were 
ratified by Serbia and that Parliament had been very active in adopting new legislation in order to 
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align with the EU acquis communautaire, which indicates positive results in that regard. However, 
the EC argues that “inconsistency in case-law remains a concern, especially at the level of appellate 
courts”147 which indicates the pathology of legal incoherence. It also argues that Serbia’s Parliament 
still extensively uses urgent procedures when adopting new legislation and in that regard it provides 
the recommendation that:  
The transparency of the legislative drafting process should be further enhanced and sufficient 
time given for effective consultation of all interested parties to ensure a more predictable legal 
environment. More attention also needs to be given to the implementation and monitoring of 
enacted legislation. 148  
This statement specifies that laws are not stable and not enforced which indicates the presence of the 
pathology of legal instability and the pathology of lack of enforcement of law. Legal instability and 
adoption of laws under urgent procedures indicate a lack of predictable legal environment, i.e. lack of 
legal certainty, which could possibly be a new negative trend.  
The EC also argues that a recently introduced offense in Article 234 (“abuse of position by a 
responsible person”) of the Criminal Code should be monitored as it relates to private operators. This 
is because the majority of cases that were previously qualified as offenses from Article 359, “abuse of 
office”, are now requalified under a new criminal offense. This indicates that this article was 
introduced in order for specific private operators to be constrained, which is an indication of the 
pathology of lack of generality of law.  
7.2. Protector of Citizens’ 2013 Annual Report149 
According to PC’s report which analysed the year 2013, there were no “palpable improvements” in the 
judicial system, although this was the second round of reforms, which followed the first unsuccessful 
reform round. Report finds that judicial independence continued to be threatened and in that regard it 
provides one of the examples. It explains that the chamber of the Court of Appeals in Kragujevac was 
pressured to change the decision of a lower-instance court but refused to do so which caused the 
members of the chamber to be removed from office, while against the president of the chamber 
disciplinary proceedings were initiated. The report explains that HJC which should ensure judges’ 
independence continued to be “tight-lipped” in public in relation to cases that were a matter of 
concern, and that powerful politicians could decide upon the implementation or non-implementation 
of laws over the rule-of-law certainty. The report claims that: 
The work of institutions remains susceptible to party politics and public officials at various 
levels have been using them to promote their parties’ and their own personal agendas.150   
These statements indicate that the judiciary lacks independence, while the non-acting of the HJC and 
misuse of institutions for personal interest of politicians indicate the pathology of politicisation of 
judicial structures. Moreover, non-implementation of laws indicates the pathology of lack of 
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enforcement of law that resulted in lack of legal certainty, which could possibly be a new negative 
trend. 
The report further explains that the PC in 2013 received a large number of citizens' complaints in 
relation to violation of right to a trial within reasonable time, right to a fair trial, non-enforcement of 
court decisions, complaints for non-acting pursuant to Constitutional Court decisions etc. In that 
regard report claims that: 
Reliable, robust, quick and efficient judicial enforcement of human rights is the cornerstone of 
any human rights protection system, and the one in Serbia is currently on shaky 
foundations.151   
This indicates that the judiciary lacks efficiency, while non-enforcement of court decisions indicate 
the pathology of lack of enforcement of law since citizens cannot reach justice even when they have 
a court decision. The report also pointed that there is a lack of will on the side of the Bar associations 
to discipline lawyers when citizens complain on their work which negatively affects citizens’ trust in 
justice and creates legal uncertainty. However, the PC welcomes laws that were adopted in 2013 and 
which will be in effect as of January 2014 since these laws aim to improve citizens’ access to justice, 
citizens’ right to a trial within reasonable time and right to a fair trial which the PC expects will 
improve judicial efficiency.  
7.2.1. Summary of Analysis for year 2013 
When comparing the EC Progress Report with the PC Report it can be noticed that the EC mentions to 
a much lesser degree the problem with judicial independence, than the PC who provides particular 
examples when judicial independence was threatened which clearly indicates the pathology of 
politicization of judicial structures.  
Nevertheless, the data from the two reports indicate that the Serbian judiciary in 2013 lacked judicial 
independence, impartiality and accountability (indicators of sub-variable judicial impartiality). It 
had indications for judicial corruption and a lack of citizens’ trust in justice, judicial efficiency, 
effectiveness and technical resources (indicators of sub-variable judicial capacity). It also had 
problems with frequent adoption of laws/unstable laws, inconsistency in case law/incoherent laws, 
lack of implementation of laws which indicates the pathology of legal instability, pathology of legal 
incoherence and pathology of lack of enforcement of laws (all three pathologies undermine sub-
variable formal legality). It also identified the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures (which 
undermines sub-variable judicial impartiality) and an indication for the pathology of lack of 
generality of law (which undermines sub-variable formal legality). Furthermore, it identified a lack 
of legal certainty which could possibly be a new negative trend. On the other hand Serbia has positive 
results in terms of ratification of international human rights instruments and alignment with the EU 
acquis (indicators of sub-variable of substantive legality).  
Therefore, the state of four sub-variables is the following. Substantive legality is satisfied according 
to the EC (the PC does not provide data about it), while empirical results indicate that formal legality, 
judicial impartiality and judicial capacity are not satisfied according to both reports. The PC Report 
implicitly stated that the second round of reforms did not improve state of the judiciary, The PC’s 
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report implicitly stated that the state of reforms did not improve, while the EC stated that reforms are 
going in the right direction although it can be seen that results are mainly negative than positive. A 
summary of the results are found in the Appendix. 
7.3. Anti-Corruption Council Report on Judicial Reform from 2014152 
The ACC Report analysed the Serbian judiciary “from the moment it was finally established that the 
judicial reform had failed up until the present day”153, in order to examine if there had been any 
improvement from its previous 2012 report.  
It claims that judicial independence in Serbia does not satisfy any of the European Court of Human 
Rights criteria for judicial independence stating that: 
 ...judicial officials have no guarantee against outside pressures from the executive and 
legislative power branches, as well as against the internal pressure from court presidents, 
public prosecutors and political parties.154   
The ACC explains that “the biggest problem” presents that the Ministry of Justice and Chairmen of 
National Assembly are involved in the work of the HJC and SPC (the highest judicial bodies which 
elect judicial officials), i.e. members of executive and legislative take part in judiciary power.  It 
provides concrete examples of law provisions that were introduced with the reforms and which 
worsened the state of judicial independence. For example, under current Law on Judges, judges can be 
assigned to work in the office of the Minister of Justice (executive), although this was not the case 
before the reform as these functions are incompatible. The same is with the term of office of judges, 
which previously was permanent, but which changed with the Constitution in 2006. It states that 
amendments of The Law on Organization of Courts and the Law on Public Prosecution from 2013 did 
not make significant changes in relation to judicial independence and that the judiciary continued to 
lack financial independence. It also presented an example of pressure on judges when acting president 
of the court pressured a judge to withdraw a decision to return a passport to a defendant, while the 
HJC failed to protect a judge. Furthermore, the ACC argues that public survey about how citizens 
perceive judiciary showed even much worse data comparing to previous ACC’s report from 2012 
(82% citizens have the opinion that court is biased, 83% have the opinion that the judiciary is 
dependent on political parties, and 84 % of citizens have the opinion that the justice system is 
inefficient). 155  The above mentioned data therefore indicates that there is a lack of judicial 
independence and that there exists pathology of politicisation of judicial structures, i.e. judicial 
structures are misused for personal interest of domestic change actors, as well as that there is a lack of 
citizens’ trust in justice. 
The ACC further reports that holders of judicial offices are inadequately paid for their work, especially 
in Belgrade, where they face greater workloads. Aside from low salaries (financial resources), the 
judiciary also faces lack of consumables. Although a new court network was introduced in January 
2014 all three Basic Courts continued to have non-functional premises. The ACC particularly provided 
example of the Misdemeanour Court which is located in 15 different buildings in Belgrade and which 
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also lacks technical equipment and an electronic database system for assigning cases, due to which the 
right to get a natural judge is threatened (impartiality of judges). The ACC explains that the new 
court network caused an increase in costs, trials to be postponed, proceedings to last longer, and a 
manifold increase in differences of judges’ workload. The abovementioned data therefore indicates 
that the judiciary lacks resources (financial-spatial, technical and also human in Belgrade courts) and 
that reform with the new court network negatively affected overall judicial efficiency. 
The ACC also found that the Law on the Organization of Courts did not make any step in regard to 
harmonization of court practice for which there exists “striking” difference among the four Appellate 
Courts which indicates the pathology of legal incoherence. Bearing in mind that lack of uniform 
court practice entails lack of predictability in the judicial decision-making process, it can be argued 
that legal incoherence caused a lack of legal certainty, which could be a new negative trend. 
7.3.1. Anti-Corruption Council Supplement to the second report on judicial reform for 2014156  
This ACC’s report analysed the introduction of notaries and bailiffs in the Serbian judiciary. It stated 
that the Law on Public Notary Service from 2011 was amended three times before it was finally 
adopted in 2014, which according to the ACC speaks about the quality of that law. It claims that 
provisions of Law on Public Notary Service were not in accordance with the Serbian Constitution, 
systemic laws and comparative standards and that it is unclear why Government granted a monopoly 
to notaries to draw up non-public documents. The ACC argues that: 
The fact that the law had been changed three times before being implemented clearly indicates 
that the Government was adjusting the law to some future notaries because of which the 
Notary Office began working even before the requirements for it were met.157   
On the other hand, the ACC explains that granting of exclusive rights to notaries for drawing certain 
contracts caused a lawyers’ strike because of which courts were not working from October 2014, 
which together with the adoption of laws under emergency procedures caused “total chaos in the 
judiciary”. Data shows that 120,386 court proceedings were postponed, which the ACC says clearly 
indicates that there would be enormously many pending cases by the end of 2014.158 It also argues that 
there is a possibility that notaries were elected not according to their quality but according to their 
affiliations. As regards to private bailiffs (who, together with courts, enforce court decisions) the ACC 
reports that they are the only one with authority to collect fees from public utilities and that uneven 
distribution of cases between bailiffs caused the creation of privileged bailiffs groups. 
Lastly, the ACC explains that low quality of laws caused frequent changes in legislation—“what is 
born with a hump shall not be rectified by time”. 159 It argues that low-quality laws are the result of 
adoption of laws under emergency procedures without public debate which presents a systemic 
problem in the Serbian judiciary.  
In conclusion, this statement clearly indicates the presence of the pathology of legal instability which 
arguably caused another negative trend i.e. legislation that lack quality. On the other hand, the 
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ACC statements about notaries and bailiffs indicate that laws were amended to serve the interest of 
particular groups that became privileged which indicates the pathology of lack of generality of law. 
In addition, incoherence of notaries’ law with other laws indicates the existence of the pathology of 
legal incoherence, while suggestions that notaries were elected according to particular political 
interest indicates the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures. Furthermore, data from the 
report indicates that the introduction of notaries which caused lawyers’ strike indirectly decreased 
judicial efficiency in 2014. 
7.4. The EC Progress Report 2014160  
According to the EC’s progress report 2014, which examined period between October 2013 and 
September 2014, there had been limited progress in the area of the judiciary and fundamental rights. 
This indicates that the EC found that the state of judiciary is worse comparing to report 2013 which 
stated that “there has been some progress“ in the latter.161 
The EC Progress Report claims that current laws and the constitution continue to leave room for 
political influence in the area of judicial independence. It argues that the judiciary lacks financial 
independence and that another serious concern is that public authorities comment on trials and arrests 
before a court decision is made. It indirectly claims that impartiality of judges is not ensured in 
practice since the system of random allocation of cases does not work properly in all courts due to 
problems with or lack of an electronic data management system.  In relation to accountability, the 
report states that four charges against judges were processed, which presents improvement comparing 
to 2013 but there is still a need for effective implementation in relation to disciplinary procedures. 
This implies that the EU indirectly stated that accountability is not ensured in practice. The 
abovementioned data therefore suggests that the judiciary continued to lack independence and 
impartiality while non-implementation of laws in relation to accountability and impartiality indicates 
that the pathology of lack of enforcement of law still exists, as well as that judiciary lacks technical 
resources.  
The EC reports that the Supreme Court of Cassation was involved in the national programme for 
reduction of backlog cases, which is a step forward but that varying workload between judges as well 
as backlog cases remain a concern. The Constitutional Court had an increase in backlog cases in 2013 
(with 16 000 pending cases in 2013, compared to 12 000 cases at the end of 2012)162, which indicates 
that judicial efficiency was worsened. One improvement that is mentioned is that the first generation 
of notaries had been appointed in July, but the EC expresses concerns in relation to the procedure and 
selection of appointed candidates.  This statement indicates possible irregularities and the existence of 
the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures in relation to notaries who present new judicial 
structures. 
Furthermore, Serbia ratified all international human rights instruments and it continued to implement 
EU legislation, which as before indicates positive results in that regard. It reported that Parliament 
was involved in intensive legislative activities and that the practice of adoption of laws under urgent 
procedure without debate increased even more in 2014 which indicates the pathology of legal 
instability. It stressed that case law remains inconsistent particularly among appellate courts, 
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suggesting the pathology of legal incoherence. All this indicates a lack of a predictable legal 
environment, a possibly new negative trend- lack of legal certainty.  As in its previous report, the 
EC pointed that there is an increase in requalification of cases from article 359 to new article 234 
(abuse of position) according to amendments of the Criminal Code, stating that:  
This illustrates a continuing tendency to overuse these offences in the context of business 
disputes, which is harmful to the business climate and legal certainty.163  
This statement indicates the pathology of lack of generality of law, i.e. that the new article 234 was 
introduced in order to constrain specific groups of people and to be misused in context of business 
disputes. 
7.5. Protector of citizens’ 2014 Annual report164 
The PC explains that the highest number of citizens’ complaints that it received in 2014 relates to the 
violation of right to a trial within a reasonable time and that there had not been corresponding 
reduction of these complaints although the Law on Organisation of Courts was introduced. This 
indicates that previously mentioned laws whose adoption was welcomed by the PC’s report in 2013 
did not provide expected results and did not improve judicial efficiency. 
The PC further argues that citizens are in the situation that their previously enjoyed rights are 
restricted, with often contentious legal provisions in relation to formal law which negatively affected 
the most vulnerable citizens and undermined legal certainty. The PC argues that this is a consequence 
of a “worrying trend” of Parliament’s adoption of laws under urgent procedures without public 
discussion. It explains that: 
The provisions of laws passed in this way are often unenforceable and non-harmonised with 
the provisions of other regulations, which poses a serious threat to the unity of the legal 
system and undermines legal certainty and the ability of citizens to exercise their rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution and laws. 165 
The abovementioned clearly indicates the existence of the pathology of legal incoherence and 
pathology of legal instability which also derived a new negative trend, i.e. lack of legal certainty. 
Namely, the PC provided an example that one complainant was in May charged to pay a court stamp 
duty of RSD 39 300 but that this amount was decreased to RSD 390 in December, after the Court of 
Cassation took a different legal stand in the matter. This case therefore indicates that rules and legal 
stands are changing even within a couple of months without ensuring predictability, which suggests 
that the Serbian judiciary was faced with a new negative trend of lack of legal certainty. 
The PC further discussed the introduction of notaries and bailiffs in the Serbian judiciary and it stated 
that in relation to the problem with urgent adoption of laws without public debate the Law on Public 
Notaries presents “one of the most dramatic examples“ which caused enormous problems in practice. 
It explained that: 
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The ill-advised, rushed and (for the citizens) costly exercise in introducing the profession of 
notary public in Serbia, coupled with an unwillingness of the Ministry of Justice to admit and 
remedy the mistakes in due time...culminated in a strike by attorneys.166  
The PC clarified that granting notaries the exclusive right to draw up property sale contracts caused a 
strike of attorneys which then paralysed the justice system and even further worsened citizens’ right to 
efficient and accessible justice. It stated that: 
...Rather than providing an impetus to legal certainty of citizens, the introduction of the 
office of notary public has become yet another acrimonious and harmful episode in the all 
too well known saga that is the judiciary reform in Serbian.167 
As regards private bailiffs, the PC argues that their work was inefficient and unfair, that cases were 
unevenly assigned which caused corruption. The abovementioned data therefore indicates that 
introduction of bailiffs as well as notaries did not provide expected results, i.e. it did not improve 
judicial efficiency and legal certainty, but rather worsened the situation and made space for even 
more irregularities.  
In relation to judicial independence, the PC argues that judicial bodies of HJC and SPC still consist of 
members who violated the rule of law and that the HJC did not protect judges that were pressured but 
rejected disciplinary reports in that regard which indicates that the judiciary lacks independence and 
the existence of the pathology of politicisation of judicial structure. 
7.5.1. Summary of Analysis for year 2014 
When comparing the EC report with the PC and ACC reports for 2014, it can be noticed that judicial 
independence (indicator of sub-variable judicial impartiality), was not mentioned to be the problem 
to the same extent as it was in the PC report and particularly in the ACC reports. Data from the ACC 
and the PC reports indicate the pathology of politicization of judicial structures (which undermines 
sub-variable judicial impartiality), contrary to the EC report, which did not provide data in that 
regard. Moreover, the PC report and particularly the ACC supplement report discussed to great extent 
problems that came with the introduction of the so called new judicial professions, i.e. notaries and 
bailiffs, of which data in the ACC report indicates the pathology of politicization of judicial structures 
and the pathology of lack of generality of law in relation to notaries and bailiffs. 
Nevertheless, data from the three types of reports indicate that the Serbian judiciary in 2014 was either 
facing problems or did not progress comparing to the previous year in regard to judicial independence, 
impartiality, citizens’ trust in justice (indicators of sub-variable judicial impartiality). 
Accountability of judges (indicator of sub-variable judicial impartiality) improved when compared 
to year 2013 (with 4 disciplinary procedures compared to only 1 in 2013), but lack of effective 
implementation indicates that accountability is still not ensured in practice. Judicial efficiency 
(indicator of sub-variable judicial capacity) worsened comparing to year 2013, and the judiciary 
lacks financial (spatial) and technical resources (indicator of sub-variable judicial capacity), while 
Belgrade courts particularly lack all resources (indicator of sub-variable judicial capacity). Serbia 
continued to align its laws with EU legislation (indicator of sub-variable substantive legality), so 
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results are positive in that regard. It continued to have problems with frequent changes in laws 
(unstable laws), inconsistency in case law (incoherent laws), lack of generality of law, lack of 
implementation of law which indicates the pathology of legal instability (that increased), the pathology 
of legal incoherence, the pathology of lack of generality of law and the pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law (all four pathologies undermine sub-variable formal legality). Furthermore, the 
pathology of politicisation of judicial structures was identified (which undermines sub-variable 
judicial impartiality).  Data from reports also indicate the presence of a new negative trend detected 
in 2013, i.e. lack of legal certainty as well as another new negative trend, namely lack of legal 
quality. 
Therefore, the state of four sub-variables is the following. Substantive legality continues to be 
satisfied according to the EC report (the PC and the ACC did not provide data about it), while 
empirical results from all three reports indicate that formal legality, judicial impartiality and 
judicial capacity are still undermined and without progress comparing to the previous year. A small 
improvement in accountability of judges (one indicator of sub-variable judicial impartiality) is 
however not enough for the conclusion that there had been progress in overall judicial impartiality, 
bearing in mind other indicators of judicial impartiality. 
In January 2014 Serbia began formal accession negotiations with the Union, and a new network of 
courts started to function. Data indicates that negative results of the state of judiciary in Serbia are a 
consequence of the new network of courts and the reforms that introduced notaries, which caused a 
lawyers’ strike that paralysed the judiciary from middle of September 2014 until middle of January 
2015. A summary of the results are found in the Appendix. 
7.6. The EC Progress Report 2015168 
According to Progress report 2015 which examined period between October 2014 and September 
2015, “Serbia’s judicial system has some level of preparation. Some progress has been made.”169 
This indicates better state of judiciary compared to report 2014 where it was stated that progress had 
been limited.  
The EC Report continues to stress that both the Constitution and the legislative framework need to be 
amended to ensure judicial independence. According to the EC: 
Judicial independence is not assured in practice. There is scope for political interference in 
the recruitment and appointment of judges and prosecutors.170 
The EC clarifies that the HCJ and the SPC did not protect judges and prosecutors in specific cases 
when their independence was threatened and that public authorities continued to undermine judicial 
independence, by commenting on ongoing judicial proceedings. It also stated that random allocation 
of cases in courts is not fully implemented in practice and leaves room for interference by the 
president of the court or the administration. Previously mentioned data therefore indicates that judicial 
independence and impartiality are threatened and the pathology of politicisation of judicial 
structures while practical problems with random allocations of cases indicates that laws are not 
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implemented in practice which indicates the pathology of lack of enforcement of law. In relation to 
accountability, the EC reports that in eleven cases the HJC brought final decisions and dismissed five 
judges which suggests an improvement comparing to the previous year, although the EC states that 
sanctions were not high. It stated also that there had been fourteen cases against judges who did not 
want to declare important changes in their property ownership, and that “corruption remains prevalent 
in many areas”,171 which indicates the existence of corruption in judiciary. 
The EC found that judicial efficiency is still a matter of serious concern, due to the existence of a 
great number of old backlog cases. It stated that targets from the national programme for reduction of 
backlog cases from 2014 have not been met, partly due to the lawyers’ strike. However, the number of 
backlog cases fell in Basic, Higher and Administrative Courts, due to the adopted law on protection of 
the right to trial in a reasonable time in May 2015, while it increased in the Supreme Court of 
Cassation. This therefore indicates a small improvement in the reduction of backlog cases in 
specific courts. The EC found that the problem with workload of cases still persists, with Belgrade 
courts being the most burdened. Prosecutors who started to lead investigations, were not provided with 
staff and other resources for their extended workload, which indicates that prosecution and particularly 
Belgrade courts lack human and other resources. On the other hand, the EC stated that public 
notaries which were introduced with the objective to improve efficiency and reduce workload of 
courts, instead created problems, due to their monopoly on real estate transactions. 
According to the EC, the Serbian Parliament continued to adopt a vast number of laws and to align 
itself with the EU acquis communautaire which indicates continuing progress in that regard. 
Nevertheless, the EU stated that: 
The use of urgent procedures, including on draft legislation linked to the EU accession 
process, remained extensive.172  
On the other hand, the report welcomed that the Supreme Court of Cassation adopted an action plan in 
May 2015 in relation to harmonisation and monitoring of court practice, which indicates a step 
forward in solving a problem with inconsistency in judicial decisions, i.e. the pathology of legal 
incoherence. It stressed that the Judicial Academy which continued to provide training to judges, 
should become an entry point for judicial profession stating however that: 
The offered continuous training is insufficient to help practitioners overcome the serious 
challenges posed by numerous changes in the law and the poor overall quality of the laws173.  
The above mentioned statement about numerous changes in the law indicates the existence of 
pathology of legal instability, lack of judicial effectiveness as judges are in problem to respond to 
law challenges, as well as that Serbian judiciary faces problems with legislation which lack quality. 
The latter therefore indicates the presence of a new negative trend, i.e. lack of legal quality.  
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7.7. Protector of citizens’ 2015 Annual report174  
The PC report argues that in 2015 many citizens of Serbia were faced with legal uncertainty. Urgent 
adoption of laws remains to be a problem. The report exemplifies that the Law on Public Notary was 
amended as much as two times in 2015. It explains that: 
Laws passed in a deficient, excessively short procedure, lacking mutual harmonisation and 
with conflicting provisions of the same law or other laws, stipulating solutions that often baffle 
experts, let alone all those who are affected with the specific legislation, and with uneven and 
selective implementation, coupled with uncertainties surrounding the case law applied in the 
disputes arising from or in connection with their implementation, have resulted in excessive 
formal normativism and not much in the way of actual legal certainty in Serbia. 175 
This statement indicates that the pathologies of legal incoherence, legal instability, and lack of 
enforcement of law continued to exist. Furthermore, it can also be concluded that the pathology of 
legal instability derived, as already was mentioned in previous reports, a new negative trend which 
citizens face, i.e. lack of legal certainty. The latter is also confirmed with Protector of citizens’ 
statement in relation to the Criminal Code Procedure, for which experts found that it did not provide 
results after two years of application. In regard to the Criminal Code Procedure the report stated that: 
It fails to provide sufficient guarantees for the protection of human rights due to both inherent 
systemic shortcomings and significant technical legal shortcomings which leave much room 
for different interpretations, thus leading to potential legal uncertainty and inequality of 
citizens before the law.176 
On the other hand the report found that adoption of the Law on Protection of Right to Trial within a 
Reasonable Time caused considerable improvements in relation to citizens’ right. The PC however 
explained that judges tend to sacrifice the quality of trials, in order to provide more efficient 
judgments which leads to lower quality of judgement and quashing of court decision after appeal. This 
data therefore implies that there had been improvements in judicial efficiency but that introduced 
measures negatively affect the state of judicial efficiency in the long run. In relation to judicial 
independence, the PC stated that: 
There is a strong – yet difficult to substantiate – perception that judicial and prosecutorial 
functions are heavily influenced by the political authorities.177 
The report presented an example of a judge who was publicly criticized by the Minister of Justice for 
its decision to give back the passport to an accused businessman, and who was later disciplinarily 
charged by the HJC for disclosing to newspapers information in regard to his decision, after which 
judges’ term in the Special Chamber of the Higher Court had not been renewed and he left the 
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profession of judge. This example therefore indicates that judicial independence continues to be 
threatened and that the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures (HJC) remained.  
7.7.1. Summary of Analysis for year 2015 
When reading the EC reports it can be noticed that the EC became clearer and provided more specific 
evaluation of the situation in relation to the judiciary comparing to its previous two progress reports. It 
also commented for the first time that the HJC and the SPC did not protect judges and prosecutors 
when they were pressured which was an indication for the pathology of politicization of judicial 
structures (which undermines sub-variable of judicial impartiality) that has been detected earlier in 
the ACC and PC reports from 2013 and 2014.  
Nevertheless, data from the two reports indicate that the Serbian judiciary in 2015 was either facing 
problems or did not progress comparing to previous years in regard to judicial independence, 
impartiality, corruption in judiciary (indicators of sub-variable judicial impartiality). The same 
applies to judiciary resources, effectiveness (indicators of sub-variable judicial capacity), frequent 
changes of laws/unstable laws, lack or uneven implementation of law, inconsistency in case law/law 
incoherence, which indicates the pathology of legal instability, the pathology of lack of enforcement of 
law, and the pathology of legal incoherence (all three pathologies undermine sub-variable formal 
legality). It is also identified the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures (which undermines 
sub-variable judicial impartiality). Data indicates a small improvement in relation to accountability 
of judges (indicator of sub-variable judicial impartiality) as well as in judicial efficiency, which in 
some courts progressed, while it worsened in other (indicators of sub-variable judicial capacity). As 
in the previous years Serbia still aligns its legislation with the EU acquis (indicator for sub-variable 
substantive legality). However, data from reports indicate new negative trends that are detected in 
previous years’ reports, namely lack of legal certainty and lack of legal quality.  
Therefore, the state of the four sub-variables is the following. Substantive legality continued to be 
satisfied according to the EC report (PC did not provide data about it), while empirical results indicate 
that formal legality, judicial impartiality and judicial capacity are undermined according to both 
reports. Small improvements in accountability of judges (one indicator of sub-variable judicial 
impartiality) are however not enough for the conclusion that there had been progress in overall judicial 
impartiality, having in mind other indicators. The same applies to judicial efficiency (one indicator of 
sub-variable judicial capacity) where small improvements were noted although overall judicial 
efficiency is still unsatisfied and although other indicators of sub-variable judicial capacity are not 
satisfied. 
In September 2015 Serbia finished an action plan for opening of Chapter 23. The data indicates that 
reforms with notaries and the lawyers’ strike left consequences also on the state of the judiciary in 
2015 but that the adopted law on protection of the right to trial in a reasonable time improved judicial 
efficiency in some courts, although it negatively affects judicial efficiency in the long run according to 
the PC. A summary of the results are found in the Appendix. 
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7.8. The EC Progress Report 2016178 
According to the progress report 2016 which examined period between October 2015 and September 
2016, it is stated that “Serbia’s judicial system has some level of preparation,”179 which indicates the 
same level of progress as in the last year’s report. 
The EC report continues to stress that judiciary lacks independence in practice. However, the EC for 
the first time explicitly stated that the role of the National Assembly in regard to the appointment of 
the highest judicial officials should completely be erased from the Constitution as well as that courts’ 
presidents and prosecutors’ offices threaten independence and impartiality of judges and deputy 
prosecutors. Moreover, it claims that the HJC’s and the SPC’s indifferent attitude in relation to 
political authorities’ public commenting of court cases also negatively affects judicial independence. 
The abovementioned data therefore indicates a lack in judicial independence and impartiality as 
well as the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures in regard to HJC and SPC bodies. The 
EC further argues that a small number of judicial officials is sanctioned with only eight disciplinary 
proceedings and one initiated dismissal procedure in 2015. This indicates that judges’ accountability 
is not ensured in practice and that the pathology of lack of enforcement of law continues to exist. 
The EC claims that corruption is still highly present and without progress compared to previous year, 
which indicates the existence of corruption in the judiciary. 
The EC pinpoints that the national plan for reduction of backlog cases yielded limited results, as well 
as the newly adopted law on mediation which resulted in increase of the overall backlog of court cases 
in 2015. However, it noted a positive impact in relation to the adversarial system which came with the 
new criminal procedure, and with its option to cancel criminal prosecution reduced significantly 
number of new cases that are reaching the courts before the courts. Nevertheless, the EC stated that :  
The overall length of proceedings and the backlog of cases remain serious concerns.180  
The report further explains that significant differences in the workload of judges and prosecutors still 
persist, and that information and communication technology in the courts is not developed. Belgrade 
courts are the most overburdened and suffer from lack of space and IT equipment. The EC argues that: 
Specific resource challenges for the prosecution service stemming from a new prosecutor-led 
investigation model have not been solved. Further efforts are needed to ensure that budget 
planning and resource allocation match service delivery needs. 181 
The abovementioned data therefore indicate small improvements in terms of judicial efficiency, 
although the overall level of efficiency is still unsatisfied. Moreover, lack of financial resources and 
technical resources impedes the judiciary from properly functioning. On the other hand, the EC 
reports that the Parliament’s role in the accession negotiations process increased and that Serbia 
continued to adopt EU legislation and to comply with acquis communautaire which as before indicate 
positive results in that regard. The EU stresses that the urgent procedure for adoption of laws should 
be limited, while transparency, quality of law making should be increased. This data indicates the 
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existence of the pathology of legal instability as well as lack of legal quality, a new negative trend 
that was already mentioned in previous reports.  The EC stated that courts of the same instances 
started to have meetings, in order to standardise court practice which presents an improvement. The 
EC explains that: 
Frequent changes in legislation and insufficient training make the legal environment 
challenging for the judiciary, which leads to inconsistency in court practice. There is a strong 
need for practical in-service training for all categories of staff responsible for the quality of 
justice. 182 
This EC statement indicates not just the continuing presence of the pathology of legal incoherence, 
but also that the judiciary has problems with effectiveness since there is a strong need for training of 
judiciary staff.  
7.9 Protector of citizens’ 2016 Annual Report183 
The PC’s report stated that the public finds that judges and prosecutors are under political pressure and 
that they lack independence. It presented a case which happened in Belgrade district Savamala, when a 
group of masked men demolished objects one night in March for which media and police authorities 
remained silent. The report explained that prosecution did not achieve any progress in relation to 
investigation of the case while the PC who started to investigate the case was lynched in media. The 
report presented another example when the HJC announced the election of judges in specific courts 
without previously adopting specific Bylaw that regulate procedure and assessment of candidates in 
the election process. The HJC annulled the elections, after the professional community had reacted but 
irregularities in the HJC work however negatively affected citizens’ trust in the work of that body. The 
above mentioned examples indicate lack of judicial independence, lack of citizens’ trust in judicial 
bodies and the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures. 
The PC further stressed that citizens continue to complain on the work of judiciary and that they are 
deprived of efficient, legal and timely work of the judiciary. It claims that the judiciary particularly 
faces problems in relation to the uneven workload between courts and the tendency of judges to 
sacrifice the quality of trial for efficient proceeding which does not improve efficiency of the courts in 
the long run. It also stated that from the beginning of the application of the new Criminal Code 
Procedure, there had not been enough prosecutors, although prosecutors’ powers were increased by the 
stated law. Abovementioned data indicates that judicial efficiency is undermined and that the 
judiciary lacks human resources in prosecution. On the other hand, the lack of quality in verdict 
indicates that the judiciary lacks legal quality, which presents a new negative trend.   
The PC for the first time stated that Serbia ratified the main international instruments and accepted the 
main human rights’ standards to be the part of its national legislation, which indicates positive results 
in that regard. It explained that not respecting the latter would be in collision with Serbia’s process of 
European integration. However, the PC pointed that Serbian citizens were faced with legal uncertainty 
in 2016 and it presented that 59% of all adopted laws in 2016 were adopted under urgent procedure. It 
clarified that adoption of laws under excessively short procedure caused conflicting provisions in laws, 
lack of mutual harmonisation of laws, as well as selective implementation of laws, which on the other 
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hand resulted in inconsistency and uncertainty in relation to case law and therefore negatively affected 
legal certainty of citizens. The PC exemplifies that the Criminal Code procedure, which was applied 
during a couple of years did not provide satisfactory results since its provisions leave room for a 
different interpretation which can cause legal uncertainty and inequality of citizens before the law, 
according to experts. Therefore the abovementioned data clearly indicate the presence of the 
pathology of legal incoherence, pathology of legal instability, pathology of lack of enforcement of 
law as well as new negative trends, i.e. lack of legal certainty. Namely, all three previously 
mentioned pathologies prevented citizens from having legal certainty.  
7.10. Anti-Corruption Council’s Report on Judicial Reform from 2016184  
The ACC has analysed the state of the Serbian judiciary from its last report, i.e. from 2014 until 2016 
by stating that no one did an analysis of what is the effect of alleged reforms and if reforms led 
judiciary in the right direction and it argues that: 
The situation in the judiciary is very bad, not only due to trials within an unreasonable time, 
but also due to the enormous number of laws being frequently changed, and which do not 
mirror actual life but nevertheless need to be applied by judges.185 
The report explains that laws are mainly adopted under urgent procedures, i.e. without public 
professional debate, which created low quality laws that are not aligned with country specifics and 
other systemic laws. Because of the latter, laws are changed several times even within one year which 
prevented the creation of uniform court practice that bred legal security and negatively affected 
citizens. 
The report found that:  
Due to frequent changes in legislation, citizens experience problems in finding out their 
rights and obligations, and not only because of the frequent changes but also because the 
government does almost nothing to ensure transparency, consolidation of legislation and 
free access to consolidated legislation.186 
The ACC claims that the Parliament was adopting laws in expedite procedures probably because 
Government wanted to show the EU how it implemented the reforms. The ACC however posits that 
the EU and the international community showed that they do not care about Serbian domestic 
characteristics, as they provided positive opinions about drafts of future laws although experts from 
Serbia argued to the contrary. According to the ACC:  
It does not mean that the EU knows our living conditions and our problems, and that if it gives 
positive opinion it means that we have got laws that regulate our life, taking into 
consideration our specificities.187  
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It stated that the World Bank’s “Functional Analysis of the Judiciary” from 2014 provided mainly an 
overview of practice from foreign countries without taking into consideration Serbian specifics. The 
ACC pointed that: 
Some parts of the report are totally unacceptable because the World Bank sees judiciary as a 
company...that needs to operate profitably in terms of costs, and in almost all parts of the 
report it focuses on savings in costs in the judicial system.188  
The abovementioned statements therefore indicate that the judiciary is faced with lack of legal 
certainty and lack of legal quality, i.e. two negative trends that were detected earlier. Data also 
indicates the existence of unclear, unstable, incoherent laws due to which there exist pathology of 
legal instability and pathology of legal incoherence. At the same time, data also indicates the 
presence of the third—a new negative trend. Namely, the existence of laws, which do not comply 
with country specifics and which were created as a consequence of external actors, caused the 
judiciary to be faced with lack of legal provisions that mirror actual life. 
The ACC further argues that many laws bestowed power to a small number of people which was 
particularly evident in the case of laws that regulated privatization, where the Government was 
provided with authority for disposing of state property. Another issue was that laws which were 
changed several times were not implemented in practice. The ACC stated as follows:  
Speaking about implementation, particularly apparent is that state authorities do not apply 
legal provisions, frequently change laws in order to adapt them to a specific buyer of state 
property, interpret imperative norms as discretionary, and take all necessary actions so as to 
provide privileged position to specific subjects.189  
This indicates the pathology of lack of generality of law since laws were changed in order to provide 
benefits to certain people and were not general. In addition, the lack of practical implementation of 
laws indicates the pathology of lack of enforcement of law. 
On the other hand, the ACC argues that public commenting on trials and political influence on the 
judiciary, mentioned in ACC reports from 2014, did not decrease. According to the ACC: 
Each of these statements represent a guideline and a warning of what and how judges and 
prosecutors need to do in order to please the executive power.190 
It argues that it is not possible to claim the independency of judiciary since the HJC and the SPC share 
autonomy with the Ministry of Justice in relation to the court budget, while court presidents presents 
the “extended arm of the executive”.191 Moreover, the ACC provided examples of evident influence of 
the executive on the judiciary, when one case was reassigned to an obedient judge by illegally ruling 
the recusal of the natural judge. It also stated implicitly that the Constitutional court (CC) is not 
independent from the executive, since ten out of fifteen judges from the CC are chosen by the National 
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Assembly and the President of the Republic. The ACC also found that the Judicial Academy which 
began work in 2010, did not provide expected results and report pointed that organizational structure 
of the Academy prevents it from being independent body. 
This data therefore indicates that the judiciary is not independent from executive power and that 
domestic political actors and executives misuse judiciary institutions for their interest which indicates 
the politicization of old and new judicial structures (Judicial Academy). 
The ACC pointed out that their analysis showed that the judiciary needs three times more funds in 
order to function properly, as in over 70% of the times, the HJC’s accounts had been in blockade. As 
regards to court administration, the ACC pointed out that “no one has analysed” how much staff is 
needed, according to the number of cases and the workload of the specific courts. According to ACC: 
We are not a rich country so as to allow for the number of judicial officials and employees to 
be determined on the basis of the number of party comrades that are to be employed in 
judicial institutions. In particular, we are not rich enough to have a slow, ineffective and 
inefficient judiciary. 192 
The report also stated that the Constitutional Court has great problems in relation to the efficiency and 
effectiveness presenting that the Court worked with total number of 24 791 cases in 2013 with only 
fifteen judges. The abovementioned statements indicate that the judiciary lacks financial resources, 
while specific courts (e.g. CC) lack human resources. As regards efficiency, the ACC reported that 
when reforms in 2009 began there were 1,318,059 pending cases, while the number of pending cases 
increased to 2,849,360 at the end of 2014 and lastly there were 2,837,468 pending cases at the end of 
2015. According to the ACC the data showed that:  
The reform did not give results as it neither made the judiciary more efficient nor the new 
network of courts decreased costs of the process of achieving justice. 193  
However, the ACC reports that there had been progress comparing to their previous reports as the 
Supreme Court of Cassation adopted a program for solving the backlog of old cases which already 
provided results and it also adopted the Law on the protection of the right to trial within reasonable 
time. This indicates that there had been small progress in relation to judicial efficiency although 
overall the judiciary lacks in efficiency and effectiveness.  
7.10.1. Summary of Analysis for year 2016 
According to the three types of reports, which complement each other, the Serbian judiciary in 2016 
was either facing problems or did not progress comparing to previous years in regard to judicial 
independence, impartiality, accountability, citizens’ trust in justice, corruption in judiciary (indicators 
of sub-variable judicial impartiality) and the pathology of politicisation of judicial structures (which 
undermines sub-variable judicial impartiality). It also applies to frequent changes in laws (unstable 
laws), no or uneven implementation of laws, lack of generality of law, which indicates the pathology 
of legal instability, the pathology of lack of enforcement of law, and the pathology of lack of 
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generality of law (all three pathologies undermine sub-variable formal legality). However, courts 
started having meetings to standardize court practice which indicates a step forward in solving 
problems with inconsistency in judicial decisions, i.e. pathology of legal incoherence (which 
undermines sub-variable formal legality). Steps forward are also made in regard to the reduction of 
backlog cases, i.e. judicial efficiency. Still, the judiciary lacks financial resources, while some courts 
lack either technical, human, and/or spatial resources (indicators of sub-variable judicial capacity) 
and there is a lack of effectiveness. On the other hand, Serbia continued to comply with EU legislation 
and it ratified main international instruments (indicator for sub-variable substantive legality). 
Nevertheless, the same as in the previous reports, data from these reports indicate new negative trends, 
namely lack of legal certainty and lack of legal quality, as well as another new negative trend in the 
ACC report, i.e. lack of legal provisions that mirror actual life.  
Thereby, the state of the four sub-variables is the following. Substantive legality continues to be 
satisfied according to the EC and the PC (the ACC does not provide data in this regard), while 
empirical results showed that formal legality and judicial impartiality are still undermined and 
without progress comparing to previous years in all three reports. Steps in relation to meetings for 
harmonisation of court practice are not enough for the conclusion that formal legality improved, 
having in mind other indicators which did not progress. Improvements were made in judicial 
efficiency, in terms of reduction of backlog cases (one indicator of sub-variable judicial capacity), but 
there has not been progress in overall judicial capacity, having in mind other indicators of judicial 
capacity, particularly lack of resources. Thus, sub-variable judicial capacity continues to be 
undermined with small improvements. 
In July 2016 Serbia opened negotiating Chapter 23 and 24 which relates to rule of law. Aside from 
domestic reformers whose reform approach involved reforms that were instrumentalised and 
politicised, which is confirmed with identified pathologies, data indicates that external actors, i.e. the 
reform approach of the EU and the international community contributed to a negative state of 
judiciary, particularly in relation to legal incoherence and low quality of laws as Serbian specifics 
were not taken into consideration. On the other hand the data indicates that improvement in regard to 
reduction of backlog cases was a result of adoption of the Law on the protection of the right to trial 
within reasonable time and the program for reduction of backlog cases at the Supreme Court of 
Cassation, although it is stated that the introduced measures with the previously mentioned law do not 
improve judicial efficiency in the long run.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
This study employed a content analysis with process tracing of three types of reports aiming to find 
out whether the EU has a pathological effect on Serbian rule of law after Serbia became a candidate 
country as well as to develop Mendelski’s theory on the case of Serbia, both analytically and 
empirically.  
The analysis has showed positive results in all indicators of the sub-variable substantive legality 
during the examined period, which implies that sub-variable substantive legality improved with 
conducted reforms. Namely, data from the two reports indicate that the Parliament has been very 
active in adopting and aligning its legislation with the EU acquis communautaire during the whole 
examined period as well as that Serbia ratified all the main international human rights instruments. 
The ACC report did not provide data in regard to substantive legality, although it stated that the 
Parliament was adopting large number of laws.  
The analysis has showed that indicators by which the sub-variable of judicial impartiality was 
measured, either did not have  a satisfactory level or did not improve or even worsened in some 
periods, which indicates that the sub-variable of judicial impartiality did not improve with the 
conducted reforms. The indicator of judicial accountability was the only indicator in which  progress 
was detected (in 2014 and 2015) as there was a small increase in the number of disciplinary 
procedures against judicial officials, which nevertheless still was not satisfactory as reports stated that 
accountability is not ensured in practice. On the other hand, findings have showed that judicial 
independence, as the major indicator of sub-variable judicial impartiality was threatened both de jure 
and de facto and without progress during the whole examined period. The ACC report from 2014 
provided data showing that reforms even worsened the state of judicial independence. However, the 
EU Progress reports discussed problems with judicial independence to a much lesser degree than the 
two other reports. The latter provided data which indicated the existence of the pathology of 
politicisation of judicial structures already from 2013, both in relation to old and new judicial 
structures (e.g. notaries), while the EU report provided data in that regard only from 2015. Namely, 
judicial structures did not serve their role, but were misused by domestic actors from other powers that 
did not improve over the years and thus undermined judicial impartiality.  
The analysis has showed mixed results in relation to indicators of sub-variable judicial capacity, as 
there were fluctuations in the state of judicial efficiency, although the overall state of all indicators 
(judicial resources, judicial efficiency and effectiveness) was not satisfied. Namely, during the whole 
period courts lacked judicial resources (financial, human, spatial, technical), especially courts in 
Belgrade. According to data from the ACC report from 2016 the judiciary needs three times more 
financial resources in order to function properly, while data from some reports also indicate that the 
judiciary lack effectiveness. Moreover, during the whole period judiciary lacked efficiency. However, 
some progress is detected in relation to the reduction of number of backlog cases in 2015 and 2016, 
but reports continued to stress that backlog cases presents a serious concern. The already undermined 
state of judicial efficiency worsened even more in 2014 due to a lawyers’ strike that lasted for four 
months as a consequence of the notary reform. Therefore, sub-variable of judicial capacity did not 
improve in the overall level with the conducted reforms, although small progress was identified over 
the examined period.  
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The analysis has showed that the state of sub-variable formal legality was undermined during the 
whole period, which was particularly detected through the presence of four pathologies in all three 
reports, which indicates that sub-variable formal legality did not improve with the conducted reforms. 
Namely indicators (coherent and stable laws) by which sub-variable formal legality was measured, 
was not on a satisfactory level or did not improve over time or even worsened in some periods. The 
Serbian judiciary was faced with laws that were contradictory and incoherent which caused 
inconsistency in judicial decisions and the pathology of legal incoherence. Laws were unstable and 
frequently changed under urgent procedures (even more times in one year), which caused the 
pathology of legal instability. Laws were introduced in order to provide benefits (e.g. to notaries and 
bailiffs) or to constrain certain groups (e.g. amended criminal provisions that were misused for 
business disputes) which indicates the pathology of lack of generality of law. Furthermore, laws 
were not implemented or unevenly implemented in practice which caused the pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law. Data from the ACC report indicates that external factors, i.e. the EU’s and 
international communities’ reform approach caused legal incoherence and legal instability of laws. 
As already presented, the study identified presence of all five of Mendelski’s pathologies in the 
Serbian judiciary during the examined period. Furthermore, the thesis identified three new negative 
trends or pathologies which pervaded the Serbian judiciary from year to year and in that way, on the 
basis of its empirical findings it developed the theory of the EU’s pathological power. Namely, 
incoherent, partly enforced and frequently changed legislation caused a state of the judiciary in which 
citizens are deprived from legal certainty as there is no predictability in judicial decision making and 
citizens’ rights and obligations remain unclear since provisions of laws constantly changed. The study 
therefore argues that the pathologies of legal instability, legal incoherence, and lack of enforcement of 
law derived the new pathology of lack of legal certainty. Furthermore, frequent changing of 
legislation under urgent procedures without professional debate and the involvement of experts caused 
adoption of laws which are not in coherence with other laws and which do not possess meaningful and 
quality solutions which resulted in adoption of low quality laws. The study therefore argues that the 
pathology of legal instability and the pathology of legal incoherence derived the new pathology of 
lack of legal quality. Lastly, urgent adoption of laws which are not in accordance with Serbian 
specifics, as a consequence of external forces who provided positive opinions and were giving the 
green light for laws to be adopted, caused adoption of laws which do not mirror actual life in Serbia. 
The study therefore argues that external actors’ reform approach, together with the pathology of legal 
instability derived the new pathology of lack of legislation that mirror actual life. All three newly 
identified pathologies undermine sub-variable formal legality, i.e. de jure rule of law. 
Therefore, the analysis of results has showed that the EU in combination with domestic actors, i.e the 
independent variable, positively affected sub-variable of substantive legality, but had negatively 
reinforcing effects on sub-variables formal legality, judicial impartiality and judicial capacity during 
the four-year period of 2013-2016. This implies that three out of four sub-variables, i.e. rule of law 
dimensions, did not improve but that there had been small progress in the sub-variable of judicial 
capacity (See Table 2).  
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Table 2: Results 
 Independent variables Dependent variables 
Dimensions 
Domestic trends in 
rule of law 
The EU reforms 
impact 
Effects on Rule of law, 
i.e on 4 sub-variables 
1. Substantive legality Positive Positively reinforcing Improved 
2. Formal legality Negative Negatively reinforcing Didn’t improve 
3. Judicial capacity Negative Negatively reinforcing 
Small improvements, but 
still unsatisfied level 
4. Judicial impartiality Negative Negatively reinforcing Did not improve 
 
With regards to the two hypotheses that were presented under the Presentation in of the Research 
Problem, Aim, Research Question, and Hypothesis above, the study concludes the following. 
The findings of the study supported the first (a) hypothesis since empirical results have showed that 
judicial impartiality and formal legality were not improved during the examined period. On the other 
hand the findings partly supported the second (b) hypothesis since empirical results have showed that 
substantive legality improved, while the state of judicial capacity was unsatisfactory with only minor 
improvements. Therefore it can be stated that the findings are largely in line with Mendelski’s theory.  
Having in mind previously mentioned findings of the analysis, the answer to the research question of 
the thesis—Is the Europeanisation process having a pathological effect on Serbian rule of law after 
Serbia became an EU candidate country ?— is that the Europeanisation process has had pathological 
effects on Serbian rule of law after Serbia became an EU candidate country.  Since results have shown 
that the EU is having pathological effects, the answer to the specified research question of the thesis—
To what extent and how the EU is having pathological effects?—is the following. Namely, the finding 
of the analysis showed that the EU is having pathological effect on Serbian rule of law to a great 
extent, since reforms did not manage to improve three out of four rule of law dimensions. The EU is 
having pathological effects by having negatively reinforcing effects on judicial impartiality, formal 
legality and judicial capacity dimension. EU reforms in combination with domestic actors thereby 
undermined the overall level of rule of law. The final result is that Serbia continues to have weak rule 
of law even though it became a candidate country.  
This is however in accordance with previous research on Serbia, which showed that the EU had 
limited effect on rule of law and that the reform process was slow and inconsistent and dependent on 
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domestic actors who wanted to retain control over the judiciary influenced by their post-communist 
legacies. It is also in accordance with previous research of Mendelski’s study on SEE countries which 
included Serbia, and which showed that the EU had pathological effects. Furthermore, the findings in 
relation to judicial capacity are partly in line with previous research and Mendelski’s previous research 
on Serbia, where it was showed that EU reforms had mixed results in relation to judicial capacity. 
Namely, EU reforms improved judicial capacity in Serbia only in one period by increasing judges’ 
salaries and by providing electronic equipment, while later they had negative effects.  
Considering that the findings of the study confirmed the theory of the EU pathological power, the 
thesis contributed to the existing theoretical understanding of Mendelski’s theory, as it strengthened 
the theory, which implies analytical generalization of the theory. The study contributed to the theory 
by developing it analytically, i.e. through the use of different indicators defined on the basis of the 
deeper understanding of the mechanisms from Mendelski’s theoretical concept, as well as by 
developing it empirically, i.e. through identification of three new pathologies. Having in mind that it 
analysed one candidate country of South East Europe, the study also contributed to the research field 
of European Studies, i.e. to literature that discusses Europeanisation of candidate countries, 
Europeanisation of SEE countries as well as to literature that discusses the Dark side of 
Europeanisation.  The findings of the study are particularly relevant for the present time when the EU 
is facing an existential crisis, as they show that Europeanisation is having pathological effects, which 
therefore cast doubt on the whole European Integration process in relation to future enlargement and 
also in terms of future endurance of the Union. This has particular importance for the policy decision 
making process, as it implies that EU policy makers should change their reform approach in order to 
prevent negative trends to be reinforced. 
Having in mind the state of previous research in relation to Serbian rule of law reforms, it can be 
argued that the findings of the study were partly expected. Namely, it was expected that reforms did 
not manage to improve particularly the state of judicial impartiality. It was however unexpected that 
reforms had negatively reinforcing effects on three out of four sub-variables. 
However, findings were unexpected in relation to the research problem, i.e. in regard to the arguments 
of Europeanisation scholars who argue that EU conditionality is prone to have more success, when 
membership perspective is more credible. Arguably, this was not the case with Serbia, as results have 
showed that despite Serbia became a candidate country in 2012, reforms did not cause improvement in 
the state of rule of law.  
As regards to further research, it would be particularly interesting to examine the state of Serbian rule 
of law further in the future, as Serbia has opened Chapter 23 and 24, only recently, in July 2016. 
Moreover, although this thesis provided causality between the reform approach of the EU and 
domestic actors and rule of law development, and at some points it provided that the EU reform 
approach particularly caused negative effects in some areas, it will be interesting to examine in the 
future in more detail to what extent negative trends are the fault of the EU and to what extent negative 
trends are the fault of domestic reformers. Furthermore, it will be interesting that future deductive 
studies which are testing Mendelski’s theory examine sub-variable substantive legality not just by 
examining if laws have internationally accepted rights and principles, but what is the state of their 
implementation, i.e. to what extent are these rights and liberties ensured in practice.  
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9. APPENDIX 
2013 Substantive legality Formal legality Judicial capacity 
Judicial 
impartiality 
New negative 
trends 
The EC 
Progress 
Report 
Serbia aligns with EU 
acquis communautaire 
and it ratified main 
international human 
rights standards 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability 
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
 
Indication of pathology of 
lack of generality of law 
Lack of technical resources 
 
Lack of judicial efficiency 
 
Lack of effectiveness 
Lack of judicial 
independence  
 
Lack of judicial 
impartiality 
 
Lack of  
accountability 
 
Indications for 
corruption in 
judiciary 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
The PC 
Report 
No data Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
 
Lack of judicial efficiency Lack of judicial 
independence 
 
Indications for lack 
of citizens’ trust in 
justice 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
The 
ACC 
Report 
     
Overall 
level 
Positive/ Satisfied Negative/Undermined Negative/Undermined Negative/Undermi
ned 
Negative 
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2014 Substantive legality Formal legality Judicial capacity Judicial 
impartiality 
New negative 
trends 
The EC 
Progress 
Report 
Serbia aligns with EU 
acquis communautaire 
and it ratified main 
international human 
rights standards 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability increased 
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
 
Pathology of lack of 
generality of law 
Lack of technical resources 
 
Lack of judicial efficiency, 
which worsened in 
Constitutional Court  
 
Lack of judicial 
independence  
 
Lack of judicial 
impartiality 
 
Lack of  
accountability (but 
small progress) 
 
Indication of 
pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures in 
relation to notaries 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
The PC 
Report 
No data Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability  
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
Lack of judicial 
efficiency—no progress 
Lack of judicial 
independence 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
 
 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
The 
ACC 
Report 
No data except that 
Parliament is active in 
adopting legislation 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability  
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
generality of law 
Lack of financial (spatial) 
and human resources 
 
Lack of judicial efficiency, 
which decreased 
Lack of judicial 
independence 
 
Lack of citizens’ 
trust in justice 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
 
Lack of legal 
quality 
Overall 
level 
Positive/ satisfied Undermined/did not 
improve 
Undermined/did not 
improve 
Undermined/did 
not improve 
Negative/unde
rmine formal 
legality 
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2015 Substantive 
legality 
Formal legality Judicial capacity Judicial 
impartiality 
New negative trends 
The EC 
Progress 
Report 
Serbia aligns with 
EU acquis 
communautaire 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability  
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
 
 
Lack of resources (in 
prosecution and in 
Belgrade courts) 
 
Lack of judicial 
efficiency—small 
progress (in reduction of 
backlog cases in specific 
courts) 
 
 Lack of effectiveness 
Lack of judicial 
independence  
 
Lack of judicial 
impartiality 
 
Lack of  
accountability 
(small progress) 
 
Corruption in 
judiciary 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
 
Lack of legal quality 
The PC 
Report 
No data except that 
Parliament is active 
in adopting 
legislation 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability  
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
Lack of judicial 
efficiency—small 
progress but not in the 
long run 
Lack of judicial 
independence 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
 
 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
The ACC 
Report 
  
 
   
Overall 
level 
Positive/satisfied Undermined/did not 
improve 
Undermined-small 
improvements 
Undermined/did 
not improve 
Negative/undermine 
formal legality 
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2016 Substantive legality Formal legality Judicial capacity Judicial impartiality New negative trends 
The EC 
Progress 
Report 
Serbia aligns with 
EU acquis 
communautaire 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability  
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence (step 
forward, start of 
meetings) 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
 
 
Lack of resources 
(financial, technical; 
particularly in 
Belgrade courts) 
 
Lack of judicial 
efficiency—small 
progress in reduction 
of backlog cases 
 
Lack of effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of judicial 
independence  
 
Lack of judicial 
impartiality 
 
Lack of  
accountability  
 
Corruption in judiciary 
did not decrease 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
Lack of legal quality 
The PC 
Report 
Serbia ratified main 
international 
instruments and 
standards 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability  
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
 
Lack of human 
resources in 
prosecution 
 
Lack of judicial 
efficiency 
Lack of judicial 
independence 
 
Lack of citizens’ trust 
in justice 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
 
Lack of legal 
certainty 
 
Lack of legal quality 
The ACC 
Report 
No data except that 
Parliament is active 
in adopting 
legislation. 
Incoherent and unstable 
laws 
 
Pathology of legal 
instability  
 
Pathology of legal 
incoherence 
 
Pathology of lack of 
enforcement of law 
 
Pathology of lack of 
generality of law 
Lack of financial 
resources , lack of 
human resources in 
specific courts (e.g. 
Constitutional Court) 
 
Lack of judicial 
efficiency—small 
progress in reduction 
of backlog cases 
 
Lack of effectiveness, 
particularly in 
Constitutional courts 
Lack of judicial 
independence 
 
Pathology of 
politicisation of 
judicial structures 
Lack of legal quality  
 
Lack of legislation 
that mirror actual life 
 
Overall 
level 
Positive/satisfied Undermined/did not 
improve 
Undermined/small 
improvements 
Undermined/did not 
improve 
Negative/undermine 
formal legality 
 
 
